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THE SOCIALIST EVOLVEMENT
Of

THE CUBAS REVOLUTION

1948 - I960

Rosa £• Chmpoan

Dr. Willi jot Rltchi.e»
•dvlaor

29m Itoy 197$

Fidel Castro came to power in Cuba after a surprisingly

powerless Batista fled the country during the early morning
hours of January 1, 1959.

Joyous celebration swept the

country as Castro made his triumphant journey across the

island, leaving his hideout of two years in the Sierra
Maestra for Havana.

The revolution had succeeded in over

throwing the hated Batista, for whom almost all elements

of Cuban society felt disdain.
at his overthrow*
was to come*

The people were rejoicing

let most had little conception of what

Fidel Castro, outside of being a popular

hero, was a little known commodity to the peasants who he
claimed to be leading*

Few others, including outside

observers, offered light on what the direction of the
revolutionary government would be;

indeed, many simply

resorted to an analysis composed of their own predisposed
heases*

That direction of the revolutionary government over

the first three years of Fidel Castrofs rule has led some
to conclude that the revolution has been betrayed*

After

a careful discussion of the appropriate evidence during

the years 1959*1961, Theodore Draper, for instance, con
cludes that "The revolution that Castro promised was

unquestionably betrayed."1 Draper sights the series of
broken promises regarding the nationalization of lands
and the failure of the government to comply with their

promise of elections as evidence in his support.

Others

!Theodore Draper, W^o's PffYfliUffl (»« *orkt
1962), p. 20*

z

have examined the question of betrayal on somewhat dif
ferent grounds, the result of a perceptual difference

regarding what exactly would be the fulfillment of the
revolution,

Mesa-Lago, as an example, looks at the revo

lution in terms of a Communist model, and his conclusion
is also that the revolution has been betrayed*

Such

conflicting analyses which arrive at the same conclusion

point to the fact that if one is going to talk about
ttbetrayalw of a revolution, he had better be clear in

indicating first what the most important goals of the

revolution are, and second, to show whether or not those
goals are on the way to being fulfilled, or if they have
been betrayed*
The difficulties inherent in an analysis of any

revolution regarding its goals and the consequent fulfill-

ment of them is important to note*

Additionally, one finds

even greater obstacles facing him in an examination of the
Cuban revolution*

First, there was a pronounced ideologi

cal void in this revolution compared with the explicit

doctrines apparent in others*

The revolution, says Draper,

"was not made bp a revolutionary party which had struggled
for years to formulate an ideology and create an organiza

tion."2 Snares has indicated that the only true ideological
doctrine to come out of Castrds 26th of July Movement
during its later development prior to taking power was

produced while in Mexico in 1956.

And this, he adds,

had little ideological thrust.^ Castro himself, in fact.
«**l**t Caafcro*s Revolution* P 108*
3Andres Suares, OftAL CaBtrfllm u4 flssTOllflh

3

hm admitted on occasions that his movement had weak

ideological origins.4
The Cuban revolution Is a difficult subject to

analyse in another sense*

Mush of the writing about the

revolution Is often of questionable objectivity*

This la

particularly true of the writings of the day, generally
between 1959 and 1965*

The "Communist menace" was seen

above all else la most American publications, and it was

implied that any turn toward Communism was m ipso facto
betrayal of the revolution*

Such analyses mistakenly

placed traditional democratic values In a position of

tantamount importance* and they methodically showed en*
deuce regarding the betrayal of the rwvolaMoa ©a the

basis of these high American Ideals*

Former Ambassador

to Cuba Earl B# T* Smith's book* The Fourth Flomr. is
an example of such an ajsaroaeh which immediately comes

to mind*

Edward Boowtein summarised succinctly the

problem of a dfsafiiilar frame of reference f*oa the subject
wMah Is under studyi «you cannot understand apevolatlons***

If you look at them through the eyes of a bank teller•♦•5
The immediate concern of this paper is similar in

many ways to the topics of those types of books just
described - namely, the socialist evolveaent of the

Cuban revolution, through December 1961*

Hopefully we

mmmmmmmmmmm

lffJfr-66 (Gmbxldg*, Hasat 1967), p. 32.
™jw, Gwatro'n BrolntlBii. p. 85.

^ward. Boorstein, %f feaaomle":" ^"ifPrMtiftn
ff
• - M-iLtllL|l>ll|»*"11-"*^

(Hew Yorks 1968), bt yywi,' "r'

%

will be able to transcend the "bank teller*1 syndrome and
be able consequently to examine and to judge that which
took place within as objective a value schema as la

possible*

We will strive to remember that our subject

must be approached in terms of social, economic, and

political realities of twentieth contury Cuba, and not
In terms of the best interests of the United States or

any other foreign power or ideological bias*
The socialist evolvement of the Cuban revolution

can be viewed accurately only after a survey of the back

ground events which preceided Castro's ascension to power

during the first week of January 1959»

She first chapter

of this paper deals with this important and Illuminating
background*

First, a socio-economic picture of pre-

revolutionary Cuba is constructed*

Then we will focus

more specifically on the Cuban situation immediately

parlor to the revolutionary takeover*

In the second

chapter we will approach the political evolvement of

Fidel Castro and his organization, the 26th of July
Movement*

that we will discover here ar€ the beginnings

of some of the ideas that would later be translated into

policy by the revolutionary government, and we will view
as well notions that would eventually be rejected by the

Castro government*

It Is by way of this second chapter

that we can gain valuable perspective of what would take

place once Castro did achieve power*
The third chapter of the paper will address the
Immediate subject matter, namely the political thrust

5

of the Castro regime from January 1959 to Beesabsr f96e*
The effect of the changing Cuban evironment will be

examined initially in tews of policy formulations*

The

rerolutieaary regime indeed was responsible for numerous

changes in Ctebsn society! bat a large effect was also
exerted by the outside forces of tha waited States and
the Soviet Union.

two wayst

The inputs all found expression in

in later policy formulations, and in rhetoric*

We will met * afcttnitire seeiailst ewlveastit* both

ideologically and in policy*

we will else note tha rests

of this socialist ewolvement in the pre«*t999 davwtopmeat
of Castro and the 26th of July Movement.

Finally, the paper will approach tha question of
whether or not the Cuban revolution had bean betrayed

in its early years*

At this point wa will feel obliged

to explicate what the goals of the revolution were, as

near as can be found, and to reanalyze oar evidence In

support of our resultant conclusion* fe will find that
on a basis of measurement other than a liberal-democratic

one, the Castro government was on tha whole consistent

with earlier prescribed goals* and oonesiitt*»t3y> the
revolution had not been betrayed la any absolute sense

during those early days of Castro*s regime*

It can be said that there did exist a Und of
economic boom in the 1950fs, but this was possibly mora

illasory than real.

Because of the growth in the popo*

lation which took place during the same tlaa period*

Cuba's par capita income in 1958 was tha same a* it met

been in 1947*6 The unemployment rate immediately prior to
the revolution remained at an unfortunate 16 ^&r cent,
a level some three times higher than the level of unem

ployment in the United States.7 An additional 10 per
cent of the country*s working force worked less than

forty hours per week on the average*

The essential

reasons for such a state of affairs can be adequately

summarised in three words*

sugar, monopoly, and

imperialism*

Pre-revolutionary Cuba was the world*s leading

producer of sugar, but it achieved such a status at a
high prife*

Cuba had evolved into being very nearly a

one product economy*

80 per cent of all her exports

consisted of sugar, and if one merely adds to that the

tobacco, mineral, and coffee industries* 94 to 98 per
o

cent of the countryfs total exports were accounted for**
The sugar industry on the island also constituted between
1A «nd 1/3 of the country*s Gross Hational Product*
owned 2/3 of the railroad tracks, and employed 25 por
cant of the island's labor force*

Additionally, many of

those employed by the industry ware able to work only
four months per year, as that comprises the harvesting

^Dudley Sears* "Economic and Social Problems of
Twentieth Century Cuba11* (1964) • appearing in Background

to Revolution. The, Devalonment ofJ^arnj3|uMu BObart

Freeman Smith, m* Ufom xorfcl 1966) * p* Iff"

7Xbid*
Ibid*

?Ed«rd Booretein, p. 2.
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season for the cane*

During the course of the rest of

the year* these workers were either unemployed of they
got along with whatever odd jobs that they could pick up
until the next cutting season began*

Given the problem of unemployment that the sugar
induatry largely Initiated and c*rt*,*2? rlnforc.d, th*r.
warn a definite need to either industrialize In an attempt

to ease the island's problems of unemployment, or to
expand the sugar industry in order to include more workersIt la regarding these possible resolutions to the impeding
Cuban problem of unemployment that the second and third
elements of Cuban economy* monopolization of the land*
m& imperialism* mast be considered*

tha sugar industry as a solution was viable*

Although

sugar cane was the country1 a most important product by far,

the fact that much land supposedly under can^production
was not being used testified to the industry's inefficiency.

Boorstein implies that it was in the interests of the

cant companies that such a situation existed*

Their

Interests* he says, lied with unemployment so that they
could get cutters during the short harvesting season.

11

This point of view gains substance when one can fully

appreciate the magnitude of the monopoly of land in Cuba*
As early as 1946* 8 per cent of Cuban landowners held
mmtmmmmmm

10Boo«t*int p. 3.
Op* dt.

to
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almost 3/4 of the land on the island*

IP

the monopolisation of the land by a few large
landowners gave to the sugar Industry the ability to

manipulate the island's employment picture to their own
advantage.

Also, with regard to the sugar industry, we

view for the first time U.S. dominance of the island by

way of economic imperialism*

Three quarters of all Cuban

exports want to the United States In the pre-revolutionary

period* while 80 per cent of her imports came fleea America. 3
By far the largest proportion of the former figure was
sugar.

The United Stsees, given this trading status,

was not what one might call simply a trading partner*

In 1958, 40 per cent of Cuban sugar production for that

year was in the hands of the united States*** 1/5/ was
controlled by eleven W.if ♦ companies.15 This gave to the
U»S, a large part in the idle land situation described
above*

American participation in the Cuban economy did

not md here;

the same pattern existed in other areas*

90 ^&r cent of Cuba's mineral industry was under American

control* as was 4/5 of Cuba's public utilities.

Almost
16

the whole Cuban oil industry was controlled by the u**S. 9

t2Herbert Matthews* £&& 2s$m &&8X2L ^New Yorkj

1961), p* 214*

^Joseph Roucek, "Cuba in its Geopolitical Set
ting/' <^fi|flWI1tfy agagl* •• W

{December* 1960), p. 666,

Robert Taber, "Castro1 s Cuba," $MM*£lm* •• W

(January 2$f 1960), p* 66

15"Castro Cleans the Cuban Slate*" fBltiMfff, fffj
(January 10, 1999)* P* 31*

t6Taber* "Castro's Buba*M p* 666. British interests
also had some involvement in this Industry* and this taken

9

Ever since the United States helped Cuba win her
"independence" in 1898* it had acted toward the Island
as if it was a benevolent big brother*

The Piatt Amend

ment, enacted shortly after Cuba's independence, granted
to the V«*f« the right to intervene in the affairs of

Cuba if something were deemed a threat to Cuban security.
And of course* with such favorable investment opportunities
awaiting American businessmen* the pattern of deep U*S*

fiuaacial Involvement on the island followed by governmental
policies mijmd at protecting and encouraging that in
volvement fcegan.

Cubans soon became at best limited

participants and at worst agents and instruments of the

American empire*17 "Instead of opening possibilities,
American policy limited opportunities and moved toward

stagnation at what can be termed a high level o^under

development."18
The magnitude of the American influence on the

island in addition to shear economic power was also
overwhelming* as former Ambassador Smith has indicated:

"Hie American Ambassador was the second most important
man in Cuba* sometimes even more important than the

president,",9 Political power failed to be rooted in
together with BUS* involvement constituted the entire
Cuban oil industry*

r«llliam Appleman Williams* "The Influence of the
fnlted States on tha Development of Modern Cuba" (January*

1964)* found in aMtaWWI*. M Resolution, j^t ffffAfljo^

21 &&&£& &&&* Robert Freeman

l8Ibid*, p* 193
^Booratein* p* 12.

Ltn, Ed*, p. 192*

10

local economic power**0 and this resulted in a situation
tantamount to one of colonialism.

The United States involvement also was a primary
factor in the development of the Cuban social class

structure*

Traditionally, Cuban society demonstrated the

type of class dichotomy typical of many underdeveloped
countries: a large* subservient lower class with a very

small but dominant upper class, and only a thin layer in
the middle.

During the course of this century, the middle

class rose in importance, and included intellectuals*
teachers, small businessmen, undustrlalists* entrepeneurs*
and government officials*

But significantly in terms of

the Cuban revolution as will be explicated later, it

aovar was to become a cohesive class fore**** Between
1945 and 1959* a few industrial workers ware also added to

the ranfts of the middle class, largely the result of the
success of the unions in gaining concessions from the
Batista regime*
The largest effect of the American involvement

in terms of social impact was on the lower and upper
classes*

As was indicated earlier* the United States

participated directly in blunting the development of

Cuba*

The consequences were most easily aeon in looking

at the lower class* people who were largely illiterate

Rolando S. Bonachea & Belspn P* Valdez, Cuba la
Mma&mm (harden City, H.I.i 197»* P* 69.* »•»»
21

A £|ujv on Cuba, The Cuban Economic Research
Project (Coral aaMesTma. 1965), p. 628*
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(33*6 per cent of the total Cuban population was Illiterate
in the mld*1950*a)* often unemployed* and a negligible
political force*

The oppressed state of the peasant in

the countryside gave to Fidel Castro a viable group to

lead in revolution* He said in 1959**1** It is the rural
areas which are the most radical and liberal parts of

the country*"*2
The upper echelons of Cuban society were also
affected adversely by the U.S. presence*

Even this class

was touched* says Williams, because they lacked the

power usually associated with their class.2^ In short,
the upper class could not escape the preponderance of
the foreign power because of American economic dominance.

Bonachea and Valdez argue that in a quantitative
sense* the 9*S« presence in Cuba greatly influenced the

class structure by polarizing it far more rapidly and
definitively than might have bean the case had Cuba been

allowed to develop on its own.** This was probably the
most profound impact*

But in relation to the middle and

upper classes alone* they argue* the impact was severe

In another sense*

The Cuban bourgeoisie lacked "a sense

of themselves as agents of progress."*^ Additional^*
^Oahat A Feasant Revolution," Tn&#xm*t4tmM'i

Political Jk^enaa Abstracts* v* IX (1059)^1^1^

2^Williame, "me Influence of the united States
en the Bevelopmant of Hodara Cuba*" p. 192*

*l|Bottachaa and Valdai* Sato $& %Y9*f»rlTOt P* 59.
*%id*

\2

Cuban capital was not invested in competition with U.S.

capital, but in cooperation with it.

"The result,"

say Bonachea and Valdez, "was the structural integration
of the Cuban bourgeoisie within the economy of the alien

capitalism*"*®
If such a disoriented economic and social system
nmdmd a counterpart in the political realm, it had one
in Cuba,

laniel M* Friedenberg characterizes the Cuban

political system historically as a reflection of the

economic chaos promulgated by the imperialism of the

United States**7 tfndoubtably there is a link between
the two*

Corrupt and inefficient government has been

the rule of the Cuban political setting since the winning
of independence*
General Batista once observed that Cuba

"would be a paradise if it were properly governed."
With the possible exception of the administration

of Tomas Estrado Palma* Cuba's firsto©resident,
it mrer had been properly governed.
Most of the governments since the turn of the

century have been democracies in form, in that the pres
ident and members of the legislature were elected officials.

let given the economic dependency and corrupt rule that

has existed parallel to these governments that sought
to gain legitimacy through elections, one wonders if there

^Ibid*, p* 60.
^Daniel M* Friedenberg, "Notes on the Cuban Rev-

olution," JEfea lai Bmm&* •• *38 (February 17, 1958), p. U

^^^sm^mm M^mSmmmTSSms^xie,

^3
was a direct link between the introduction of the ballot

tfe* in Cuba and the economic and social ills of the

island, as some have argued.*9 If this was indeed true,
then a major piece of evidence put forward by those who
argue that there was a betrayal of the Cuban revolution

would be rendered useless •* for they argue that one of
Castro's betrayals was in not holding the elections that
he had promised.

It is difficult to think of this

action as a betrayal if elections have historically
given rise to such undesirable situtations in the Cuban

setting*

But let us not get ahead of ourselves*

Let it

simply be said for now that Cuba's historic encounter

with democracy has been unfortunate at best and tragic
at worst*

We have now developed an adequate sketch of the
Cuban economic, social, and political situation for our
purposes*

The most important fact to remember about

twentieth century Cuba is the American involvement and

dominance, and ita effect both politically and socially.
The revolution must be viewed in the light of a struggle
for reform*

In fact* the American presence was so great

that the latter struggle would have had only a marginal
chance of succeeding without the success of the former

struggle*

Fidel spoke for many Cubans in demonstrating

a revulsion toward traditional attempted solutions to
Cuban misfortunes in 1957$

*%or instance, Robert Taber, "Castro's Cuba,"
The Katlon* p* 70,
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Cuba's problems*** will only be solved if
we Cubans dedicate ourselves to fight for their

solution with the same energy, integrity, and
patriotism our liberators invested in the country's
foundation* They will not be solved by politi
cians who jabber unceasingly of "absolute freedom

of enterprise", the "sacred law of supply and
™
demand"* and "guarantees of Investment capital."-*'
With this review behind us, we must construct a

picture of Cuba immediately prior to the revolutionary
takeover of January 1, 1959.

Some of this might seem

to be recapitulation, but to gain a totally accurate

view of pre-revolutionary Cuba for the purpose of gain
ing a valuable perspective is worth the repetition.
We will then be prepared to examine the political and
Ideological development of Fidel Castro and his movement
up to his ascension to power*

Some discrepancies exist pertaining to the economic

state of affairs on the Island in the two or three years

prior to the takeover*

Descriptions of the island during

this period range from those that characterise masses

in ignorance and poverty and riddled with disease to

contentions that the revolution was taking place amidst
relative prosperity*

In part, both viewpoints are correct.

A review of the situation for the period with scrutiny
eases the dilemma*

There does appear evidence which

would indicate that there was a rapidly growing middle
class in the 1950's in Cuba*

Draper informs us that

there was a general economic upswing in 1956, and by
that year, 22 ftr cent of the island's population fell

^^del Castro, "that Cuba's Rebels Want," The
igaaa, v* 285 (November 30, 1957), p. 400.
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into the middle or upper strata of society, a situation

only exceeded in Latin America by Argentina at that time.-51
The best economic year in Cuban history was 1957*

Borne

of the rewards of this relative prosperity went to the
urban workers, whose unions were treated very kindly

by President Batista**** A share of the prosperity
virtually eliminated for much of the pre-1959 period
the workers from the revolutionary movement.

"The

bulk of Cuban workers* as well as businessmen," said

Newsweek in May 1957* "juat don't want to upset the

applecart♦"**
While the relative prosperity on the Island was

being enjoyed in urban areas, however, out in the country
side life was not improved*

There existed no prosperity,

therefore, for almost half of the Cuban population*

Bonachea and Valdez say the "social development lagged
far behind that of the organized urban workers," and the
non-urban portion of the population lived under circum-

•to*** of poor iumsias and d.ttcfat d±.ta *

tfa*

average income in the city in the mid-1950*s was $1600
as opposed to the average income of a laborer in the

country of $130;

the literacy rate compared similarly -

/» v 31^^2^ Drag?r' <fratqa« Sassx m& eosUssl

viiew JOT&$ 1965/* p« 7o.
B4***4a*»

**H*
P* McDonald,f<ierv\
"The Cuban
Complex*" Contemporary
*»
ific /it.*,*,*!*
«.
lei
""' ' ' "t^tt.

fXJJS* v* '95 (March* 1959)* p* 152*

**"*fugar and Strife," Newsweek, v. 49 (May 6,

1957) t P* 6J*

^Bonachea and Valdes* ^p, 57-8
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41*7 P^ cent in the city compared with 11*6 per cent

in the country.*'
So in terms of economic analysis* the revolution

did take place la relative prosperity* yet there certainly
existed a large portion of the total population that did
not witness any improvement in way of life as a result*

What might be called the well developed roots of revo
lution may not have been as clear as Castro and his re

volutionary intellectuals were claiming at the time*
but there was widespread disenchantment regarding the
socio-economic situation that did not take on a revolu

tionary tone*

As one observer put It* the people were

profoundly discontented!

they wanted change* but weren't

clear in expressing what change they wanted*^
Despite discontent* particularly in the country*

side* few suspected in 1957 that the Batista regime in
two years would be overthrown by revolution.

Fulgendo

Batista had gained power by way of a military coup on
March 10* 1952.

His ascension to power was made possible

by his support in the army*

This, taken together with

the relative prosperity on the island in the mid-1950's,
was the basis of his rule in 1957*

Batista was able to

dilute the power base of potential antagonists by outlawing
opposition parties*

Be also maintainedaa cozy relationship

with the leadership of labor* a move which brought benefits

35Drap*r, qaatWftlH J&ejga *fM ££2£ii££.P- 105.
^Boorstein, p. 19»
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to the members of organized labor and which consequently
dropped them for the most part from the ranks of the
disenchanted •

But by 1958, disenchantment was reaching higher
levels*

Small bands of Cuban insurrectionists were bombing,

obstructing, burning* and generally attempting to inflict
chaos into the Cuban quammire.

Terrorist activities

ware stepped up particularly in January 1958*
ym^md

This

Batista into two decisions that seriously affected

his relationship, already spurious, with the Cuban people*
first* the internationally sponsored elections that were
scheduled for March 5 were postponed until November 1958*
Second, on March 12 Batista suspended constitutional
guarantees, a move in answer to the increased terrorist

activity of the proceeding months*

Although the former

move subverted confidence In Batista* the latter move
was perhaps the real turning point toward Batista's down

fall*

The suspension resulted in such abuses and government

sanctioned violence that those who had been committed to

Batista before were not so positive with their support now*

Late in 1958* the economy was staggering because
of rebel subversion* and the government was appearing
less likely to last much longer*

Batista finally agreed

to not participate in the elections on November 3» 1958,
but nevertheless* it was clear that those election results

would not be acceptable to the people*

Batista's candi

date won* and many accused the government of fixing the

election (this was an election not atypical for Cuba in
this regard, one might add)*

By December, Batista's last

bastion of support, the army, was losing its will to
resist the rebels, a fact not in a small part due to the
bribing of army officers by Castroists*

Batista fled the country on January 1, 1959*
leaving the country supposedly in the hands of his

designated sucessor* Due to popular disdain for Batista,
however, this transfer of power was never possible, and
the rebel government soon took command*

It was pointed out numerously at the time that few

thought that Batista would fall so easily.37 With the
advantage of hindsight, though, we can see what a pre
carious power base Batista did possess*

He was at a

great distance from the people, and was never in contact

with them}

his decisions were certainly not made in their

Interests, nor were they made after careful analysis of
what the effects of those decisions on the people would
be*

ultimately* his base of power within the army followed

the same kind of progression*

And if he derived power

from the economy, he lost most of that base as the economy
slumped badly during the course of 1958.

It doesn't take

much of a social upheaval to place off-balance an economy
with a single crop orientation as Cuba had.

Earl E.T* Smith suggests that u"*S. non-support

of Batista is another reason for the Batista downfall*
possibly the most important one*

When Batista suspended

constitutional guarantees in March, the United States
57

-"For instance, see ^Revolution in Cuba,"
weal, v. 69 (January 16, 1959)* p* 400.

Common-
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suddenly turned a cold shoulder toward the regime*

This

was translated into a suspension of arms shipments to
the government.

"The proclaimed policy of the fnlted

Stat***" says Smith* «wae nonintervention * although for
a power as the Baited States* it is really impossible not
to intervene In a country as closely associated with us

as Cuba had boen*M58 The witholding of support from
Batista probably played a role in how quickly the regime
eventually

feU* but It probably would have fallen area

if the U.S* had maintained Its support throughout* Smith
overrates the effective influence of the e\S. when he

implies that America was responsible for Castro's coming

to power*59 We can view Smith's frame of reference in
such statements as the following* which sheds some light
on his analysis of the situation!
I was convinced that It had become a fixed

American policy to oppose all Bightlat dictators*
avem those favorable to the United States* This
policy opened the door to Leftist dictators and
to the Communist Party* It was clear that this

was a dangerous gamble* as each Communist Party,
In whatever country, is a political arm of Soviet
Russia.40

Smith was not able to comprehend the levels of dissent

that were surfacing within the Cuban population*

It la important to point out* however* that the
feeling of the majority of the people even as the Castro
rebels took power was not revolutionary*
•MM****

^Smith, 5&s Fourth floor* p* 56*
^Ibid., p. 100* Bis testimony before a Senate
Subcommittee* August 30, 1960*

WIbld.t p. 160.

2D

If revolution is to mean a violent* long drawn
out* and fundamental transformation of the prevail
ing social and economic system* brought about

masses", who are "aware of the impossibility of

going on living jes they are living and so demand

changes,,,CLeni^JV then in January 1050 there was

no revolutionary situation in Cuba*4'

Cuban people felt for the Batista regime*

old regime*

There was

"In Cuba, mass support for a socialist

momtKm *~ «f*r *• .*»*. of po*«.««
takeover*

By having a sense of that which took place

both historically on the island and immediately prior
to January 1959§ we can more suitably sense the Influences
of the Cuban environment on Castro before taking power

and on his revolutionary government in its first iW*years of rule*

As we will see later* many of the early

economic policies of the Castro regime were attempts
to diversify the economy, and thus to make the economy

steadier.

The experience of the election o$ 1958 left

a bad taste in the mouths of many Cubans, leaving some*
Including Castro* wondering as to the veto* of elections

at all*

Batista's aloofness with regard to the people

must have had an effect on Castro, as he gave overriding

importance to his individual contacts with the Cuban

^'Andres Snares* p* 34*

^C* Ian Lumsden, "The Ideology, of the Revolution,"
**iin in **1»»i»yUfl*iBl «wH*vii**\ tun* VAiuvs was*, jp* •,•••
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people after taking power*

Although tha U*S. refused

to actively support Batista* it also refused to support

lied with Hie BaMsta regime* If Ambassador Smith could

be seen as a mouthpiece of American policy, as Indeed
he was so viewed by the rebels*

After I had been in Cuba for approximately

two months* and had made a study of fidel Castro
and the revolutionaries, it was perfectly obvious
that Castro was not the answer. that if Castro

came to power it would not be in the best Interests
of Cuba, or in the best Interests of the fnlted
States.45

and even If it was true that the State Department's
actual policy was far less belligerent toward Castro
«ff m£itt A*-W ^fe^v *8 **•»

<itii*Bta-^bkwk

^^^^a«^t

e*a*^k

j|mw%k^**MA'^Ij%wi ae

•MHa aMse

latter that was familiar to Hie rebels;

*aw^

^isNEfc.ew

*s*s%.^sv

It set the tone

for revolutionary Cuba's policy with regard to the U.S.
II

We should now have at our disposal a sense of
the pre-revolutionary situation on the Island*

It was

in tola environment that fidel Castro and his revolutionary

movement developed*

We will now begin our analysis of

that time period which laid the groundwork: for the
socialist evolvement of the Cuban revolution*

We will

examine the early political development of fidel Castro
and his revolutionary movement*

The one American who has a right to say that he

**Smlth* p* JO.
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knows Fidel Castro, Herbert Matthews* has written of
Castroi

"...no one know?the Cuban levolutloa who does

not knew tidal Ceafcro*"1* Than, continuing* Matthews
writes.

"Iet hia is a character of such complexity*

each contradictions* such emotionalism* such irrmtionality*
such unpredictability that no one can really know him."*5
few would argue with this analysis*

In a very real sense

the Cuban revolution is Fidel Castro - his Ideals put

t&mmpd at a particular time* his energy* his "machismo",
his "irri^onality"* as Matthews puts it* all seem to
be characteristics also of the Cuban revolution.

Matthews

also vmimm to Castro's "conviction of tha righteousness

of everything he does* which Is "basic to his character."*6
Be adds his impression that Caatrofs idealism is genuine*
as is his nationalistic pride In Cuba**7
Others have viewed Castro la a far less positive

light. It was clear to Freeman Idaooln of fiB&IBI
magazine that Castro possessed a disjointed personality

as demonstrated by his liaviag "no administrative sense*"1*8
Others have thought Castro to be a poimlariaar and a
demagogue, and m "unstable terrorist*" in Ambassador

&&th*s words* According to Javier fallpe famos Vea*

Herbert Matthews* Tha Cuban story* p. 149*
^Sbid** p* 149*
^ibid** p. 15a*
*7ibid.» p* m*

^^Freeman Lincoln* "What Has Happened to Cuban

Business?", Fortuwau v. 60 (September 1959), p* 274*
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a Cuban exile, Castro is above all a political opportunist.
In her enlightening study of the revolution's evolvement
toward Marxisa-Leninism, Loree Wilkereon concludes that
"behind tha seeming inconsistency of his political actions

lias a highly consistent will to exercise virtually

******* p***»ua p**r.«50 a* „ ^11 «*t ««« is
soma validity for this conslusion am the evidence shows*
Matthews concurs with this conclusion to an extent, but

places the blame on the corruptive impact of power itself?
he finds it appropriate to quote William Blaker
The strongest poison ever known

**

Comas from Caesar's Laurel Crown.^
It

is interesting to note Castro »s own agreement with

the argument that power generally corrupts man.

"Fortunately,"

he quickly adds* "this has never happened to me."52
Agreement on some of fidel Castro's personal
traits have been reached despite disparaties such as

those just described*

The most important of these is

the belief that Castro is not an original political

thinker.
evidence*

This appears to be the case in view of the
In his writings and speeches, Castro la con

tinuously quoting and sighting past leaders of thought,
be he Chibas, Marti* Jefferson, or Lincoln in the early
mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm0mmmmmmmmiimm»

Javier Mip Eames ¥ea» "Cuba * I**ng Hve the

Revolution," v. 147 f|f Hew Republic (November 5* 1962), p. 15.
£S8k\ ffif$lWU&SBk JfeSt- tllilllilMri^

p* 95*

Matthews* p. 153*

^"Playboy Interview* fidel Castro," Playboy.
v* 14, no. I (January 1967)* p* 84*
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years, or Marx, Lenin* or Hao in the later ones*

the

only exception to this came in the first months of
whan he and his government proclaimed a kind of humanism*
But this was short-lived.

An interesting study would

be a comparison between the writings of Castro and those

of a revolutionary leader with original political thoughta
in another developing country* like Nyerere of Tanzania

or Cabrdh. of Guinea. Unfortunately, this will have to
be left for another study*
fidel Castro was the son of a landowner, and
was educated In Jesuit secondary school.

Throughout

his school days ha was an outstanding student* scholar*

with his political thinking, of course* so a detailed

description of his early life la not necessary.

We shall

begin our look into Fidel's political development with
his college days* more particularity hiw period In law
school In the late 1940'e.

Castro's law school career la an important place

to start, because there are those who claim that even
this early In his Ufa he was a Communist, and wall read
in the political ideology of Communism.

Murkland, for

Instance* calls Castro an ardent student of HaradLsm ainea

his student daya? Most Quhm observers, however, think
that it la absurd to mt&x» along this line* Vea goes
so far am to say that not only was he not a Communist
mmmmmmmmmmmmmimmim

^Harry Banta Murkland, "Cuba* She Evolution of
Revolution",

Current History, v* 38 (March I960)* p» 131*
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la ma late 1940»s* ,fnor was he particularly interested

in soda! revolution.,l5** the evidence suggests that
this argument also has little basis*

Castro led an active political life while studying
law at the University of Havana.

And it is apparent

that his political thinking was leftist to a considerable
degree.

In 1948* Castro was a delegate to a Latin

American student convention that was being held in Bogata*

While the convention was taking place* a leftist uprising

occurred protesting the policies of the conservative
Colombian government*

Castro is said to have bean among

a group of students who participated In the uprising*
The disturbance was quelled rapidly* and fidel returned
to Havana and his study of law*

Castro was also active in student government while

in law school*

One event is particularly enlightening

regarding those who think that Castro was a Communist
at this time*

Wilderson tells us that

when he ran for the vice~preeUdency of the
student governing body of the Law School* he
drew heavily on the support of the Communist

gr^up on campus* Once elected* however# he began
milli
a militant
campaign of denunciation against his
Communist supporters, who retaliated by denoun
M*t» as a traitor.5o
Castro himself contributes to a picture of his

political frame of mind during his student days in a

Caviar Felipe Pazoe Vea* "Cuba * Long live the
Revolution," p* 15*

5%llkerson* pp* 19-*£0*
Ibid*, p* 19*
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196? interview*

le tells us In retrospect that he

began to see on his own the conflict between man's technical

possibilities and his needs for happiness*

He started

to think of alternatives*

Ton might say that I had begun to transform
myself into a kind of Utopian Socialist* At that

time I had not yet read the Cojpuniet l*ani£osj&.
1 had read hardly anything hyWJ5ai»i ffayr+^
Castro after assuming power felt the mmd for ideological

justification for the programs that he eventually pursued
ansa gainings power* a mad which he did not apparently

sense in the pre-1959 period*

Therefore, this statement

by Castro might provide us with a distorted and possibly
inaccurate view of him in the late 19¥>9a*

let in light

of those ideas regarding policy intiatives that would
begin to emanate from him five years later after Batista

became President, it Is possible that he was becoming

a kind of "Utopian Socialist" as he says* during his
student years*

But note that even assuming the grounds

for distortion that might have existed for Castro at

the time of this interview* he still admits to have not
read much Communist writing while a student*
was not a Communist while in law school*

Castro

In fact,

Hlkerson indicates that while fidel was attending school,
he became a strong supporter of Edwardo Chibas, leader

or th* PJP.C. (Ortodoxo Party).!8
The Autentlco Party had been the dominant political

*'MPlayboy Interviews fidel Castro," p* 62.
person, p* 30*
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party in Cuba since the 1920* a* but in 1946, after a
siege of inner-party squabbling, a splinter party broke
away from tha Autenticos.

This party, which was called

the Ortodoxo Party* became the leftist opposition in the
latter portion of the decade*

Its leader Chibas spoke

in liberal—democratic terms and argued for a real demo

cracy for his countrymen, not a form which hides corrupt
ifvernment and self-interested bureaucrats*

became quite active in the party.

Castro

In 1952, Chibas

died as a result of an accidentally self-inflicted wound*
and shortly after this* Fidel became chairman of the
Ortodoxos organization in Havana*

It is clear that

Castro* apparently of leftist inclinations, chose a

conventional party for his political expression*
The Ortodoxos role as the loyal opposition ended

In the spring of 1952 when Batista assumed power by way
of his coup.

Castro* fresh out of law school, chose the

route of legal challenges through the courts in order

to question the validity of Batista's presidency*

Once

again as with his political party affiliation, we find
the political expression of Castro in the form of con
ventional avenues.

This, however* would be the last

time such would be the case*

Fidel's legal challenges

proved unsuccessful* and as a result he turned to dan*
destine opposition*
Castro viewed Batista's ascension to the presidency

^Ibid.* p. 22,
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as not a revolution* but "a brutal snatching of powar*,f60
In the same statement* he then again demonstrates the

llberal-Klamocra^Lc foundation in his political thought*
"We were growing accustomed to living within the Const!*

tution," he said* M***the thirst for power is too great*
and the restraints too few when there is not a consti

tution or law other than the will of the tyrant and his

accomplices."61
Castro was proclaiming the doctrines of the

Ortodox© Party*

Let* a take a closer look at tha political

programs of the Ortedoxofe so that we might gain insight
into the thoughts of Castro at the time*

the Ortodoxo program* primarily formulated by

Chibas* was liberal and anti-Communist. Above all else*

nationalism was Its cornerstone.^2 It proclaimed the
mmad for an independent Judiciary* honest government,
f&ee labor anions* and* a considerable amount of economic

planning* * Chibas' successor* Agramonte* called for
much the same in programs, but included an emphasis
upon the mam for agrarian reform*

The Ortodoxo pro

posal for agrarian reform didn't propose the abolishment

of private ownership* but did support expropriation of
mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm»mmmmmmm

60Fldel Castro* "Proclamation on Batista^ Seizure
6!Ibid.f p. 148*
^^tllkerson, p* 29.
63Ihid*

29

idle lands*

The Coaatltutioa of 1940* the party pointed

out* had already made provisions for such an endeavor*^
"In essence,1' states Hlkerson* "the Ortodoxos were
social-democrats whose program*** was an expression of

tha everlasting yearning by the masses for a better life*"65
There's no doubt that fidel agreed with this
program* which we can see was quite leftist oriented
for what one might expect from one of the conventional
political partlea*on the Island*

The matorlal waU*

being of the citizenry was emphasized vis a vis any long
term goals*

There seams to be a lack of emphasis upon

the collective good* am its programs were oriented toward

the individual* and its goals would have ymh^ for
his material betterment*

tet despite Castro1* reaffirmations of tha phil

osophy of the party of which he was still a member,
there was now a tendency on his part to pursue the
reinstatement of liberal democracy in Cuba by way of
extra-legal means*

On August 16, 1952, he said:

The moment is revolutionary and not political*
*** A revolutionary party requires a revolutionary
leadarehlp* a young leadership originating from
the people* that will save Cuba.bb

fidel apparently could still agrees with the policies
of the Ortodoxos* but was beginning to disagree with
mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmimmmmmmmmmimmitmm

ibid*t p» 3i#

65Ibid*
^Castro* "Critical Assessment of the Ortodoxo

tarty*" {August 16* 1952)* Peyo^Uonaxy mmO&* P* *53-
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regard to tactics*

He no longer held hope of anything

coming from negotiations on the part of the party with

Batista*

The time was revolutionary, not political*

He and a group of like-thinking middle class intellectuals

ware beginning to plan an attack and a takeover of the
Moncada army post* the second most important military

establishment in Cuba*

From this bastion, they reasoned*

they could overthrow the Batista government.

Draper informs us that Castroism did not exist

before July 26, 1953* the date of the resultant unsuccess
ful attack on the Moncada post. '

This was the first

definitive action taken by the newly constituted revo
lutionary group, so in that sense it was the beginning
of Castroism.

But if Castroism has more to do with the

theoretical and ideological spectrum, then Castroism

ham begun to develop during Fidel's initial political

Fidel had been an Ortodoxo, it can be saXd that the

roots of the movement can be found with the Ortodoxo^e
Party.

It is important for our purposes to take note of
Castro's thoughts just prior to the attack*

liberal again showed through*

Castro the

"The Cuban people's

unshakable faith," he said* "rises with their uanaimous
decision to regain their constitution* their essential
freedoms and inalienable rights, trampled ceaselessly

67Draper, (fm^Ml ZM°£L *M QSMUMp P- **<
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by treacherous usurpers*"°

He also demonstrated his

nationalist sentiments, a theme which would be emphasized

throughout Castro's struggle for powers

"The Revolution

identifies with the roots of Cuba's nationalistic sen-

timent*.*"^ Than Castro spoke of the roots of the rev*
Qlutta* and its "vanguard*"
Motivated by the moat genuine "crlollo"
values, the "Revolution" comes from the soul
of the Cuban people. Its faj^mtd is a youth
that wants a new Cuba, a youth that has freed
Itself from the faults* tha mean ambitions* and
the sins of the past* The Revolution comes
from new men with new methods* prepared with the

patience* courage, and decision o&lthose who
dedicate their lives to an ideal•^

Significantly* the only groups mentioned by name in
this, the years of foundation for the "peasant revolution*"
ware the workers and students* for whom the revolution

declares Its respect, In Castro's words.

Both groups

ware supporters of the Ortodoxo Party to a significant
degree*

fidel Informs ua that the resolution bases

itself on the ideals of Jose'Mart/* a nineteenth caatttry
Cuban liberator, wm& on the ideals of the Ortodoxos*

And finally* in order to leave no doubt as to the liberaldemocratic intent of the revolution, Castro concludes
by saying!

"The 'Revolution' declares Its absolute

and reverent respect for the Constitution of 1940 and

would reestablish it as Its official code."'7

6*Tidel Castro* "®he Cuban Revolution" (July 2$§

1953)* Rovo^uomr mm&&» P- ???•
69
Ibid*

7°Ibld*

71Ibid** p* 158.
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Although the occasion for the article just described

in depth called for an enumeration of emotion-related

rhetoric* it probably is also true that few definitive
programs had bean thought about by the revolutionaries
to any degree of depth*

The only thing mentioned close

to an actual policy formulation in this article of July
23 other than the reinstatement of the Constitution of
I949 was Castro's indication that the revolution is
72

dedicated to economic prosperity for the nation*'

This is a statement of questionable substance, indeed*
but perhaps we shouldn't allow ourselves to be too
critical of this apparent absence of program suggestions
in the article.

Castro, after all* was not an intellec

tual, but ** man of revolutionary action."7-*
The Moncada attack ended In failure* and Castro
was tried and convicted as the head of the revolutionary

organisation which had initiated the assault.

trial* Castro ^aMaMMd himself*

At the

He was allowed to speak

at length after his conviction, and this occasion save
rise to Fidel's famous "History Ull Absolve Me" speech,

performed on October 16* 1955*

$ha speech would later

be made into a pamphlet and coiisidsrsd to be the doctrine
of Castro^s revolutionary organisation*

It is impor**

tant that we examine this speech in some detail* as it
mmmmmmmmmmm0mmmmmmmmmmmmmtmmmmmmmmm

7%bid*t p* 157*
^Andres Suarez* Cuba; Castroism *»<* Communism*

iS^$ P* *v*

7**The complete text of the speech is found in Fidel

55

is undoubtably the best example of Fidel's political
thinking In those formative years of his revolutionary

outlook*

In the words of Castro himself*

"Hy Moncada

speech was the saad of all the things that were done

later on*"7-*
The speech can be conveniently divided into four

distinct portions for our analytical purposes*

In the

opening section* Castro relates to the jury the events
surrounding his prosecution and the attack itself on

the Moncada post* all of which is not of immediate
interest to us presently,

that is of Interest is that

hare we find statements such as "I bring in my heart

the doctrines of Martf and in my mind the noble ideas

of all men who have defended the freedom of the people."76
The word "freedom" is a word with which wa will come

into contact from time to time in Castro's speeches
and writings*

He uses the word with varying frequency

as time goes on, and later we will see where it is notable

in Its absence*

Here the word is utilised apparently

in Its most abstract and general form* and conclusions

would be premature*

From this liberal frame of reference* Castro
accuses Batista's presidency once agiin of being uncon
stitutional* because it has corrupted the legitimate
)|MM»*il*»nM**PMI*lnM*M

7*"Playboy Interview* Fidel Castro*" p. 64*

76Castrot "History Will Absolve He," fteyo^UPftary

Strug/tie, p. 171.
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constitution of the Republic* He adds, "A legitimate
constitution is that which emanates directly from a

sovereign people."77 Again* the liberalism which he
continues to emphasise is significant. Ifcspite an in*
creaalngly militant revolutionary stanca which wa first
discovered in his July 23 article and which will also

be profoundly apparent later in this speech* fidel leaves
little doubt as to the liberal tendencies of at least
his aacrosaopic i*>litical thinking.
the second portion of the speech delineates

Jidel's conception of the revolution's relationship to
the people* aM also he describes his tMiiHtyg toward

the role of the revolutionary* He claims that the people
support his movement* and then he goes on to indicate

who ha means whan he says "the people"! the 600*000
who are out of work* the 500*000 farm workers that live

in miserable huts* the **O0*000 industrial workers whose
retirement funds have been stolen, the 100,000 small

farmers who work land that isn't theirs*78 He indicates
that tha ausfjess of the revolution is contingent upon
the support of these people* and points out that he
doesaH need nor want the support of the comfortable
and conservative sectors.79
A glimpse at Fidel's own conception of the role

of the revolutionary also surfaces* Above all else*

^Ibid** p. 173.
78Ibid*f p* 184*
79

Ibid** p. 183.
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he says* he wants to be just.

He speaks of sincerity

and good faith* and the namd "to speak clearly and without fear*"Q

In the third part* Castro does something that
he had not done before - he announces five revolutionary
laws that would have taken effect had they been able to

overthrow t*. Ml*, gov.rnn.nt.^ ThiB la th, first
time that fidel in such explicit language put forth
policies that would be paahad by a revolutionary govern
ment with himself at its head*

This portion deserves

our close scrutiny, as it is here that we find what

Castro years after referred to as "the aaad of all things
that ware done later on*"

The first law was to return sovereignty to the

people by proclaiming the Constitution of 1940 as the
supreme law of the state*
a convenient afterward!

Castro, however, provides
it would be the supreme law

of the state, he says, "until such time as the people
would decide to modify or change it*"

This can be viewed

as the first time Castro publically hedged on the supreme

applicability of the Constitution of 1940* and is the
first suggestion that fidel might have been beginning
to question in his own mind the traditional liberal
remedies of his Ortodoxo Party*

But then on a second

look, we see that we might be being over-critical.

In light of the rest of the speech, it seems doubtful
MMW

Ibid*, p* 180*
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that Fidel was hedging much on any of the programs of
the Ortodoxos*

In the second law* he returns to the line of
the uncompromising sanctity of the constitution.

He

says that upon assuming power* the government would

encompass the power of the state "except that of modify*

lag the Constitution itself."

And so* fidel leaves us

with some doubt as to his thinking regarding the con*
stltution.

Apparently he la saying that the people,

not the government, can modify the constitution.

Only

the people would have the authority to change the ulti
mate law of the land*

She third law encampasses another firsts

the

revolutionary government would grant property to all

tenant farmers* sharecroppers, renters* and squatters.

This is a hint at expropriation by the government* a
suggestion not apparent before explicitly in Castro* s

writing* but was as we have seen a program of the Ortodoxo Party*

As described here* there is no violation

of the Ortodoxo line*

Expropriation might occur* but

private ownership, it seems to be saying* would remain*
His mentioning it here Is also significant in its point*
ing the revolution toward the plight of the laborer in
the countryside*

The fourth law is the granting to workers the

right to 30 per cent of the profits*

This law taken

together with the previous one was aimed apparently
at helping out "the people," given Castrofa definition*

The fifth law brings the philosophy hinted at

m

in the previous two laws to a head.

It calls for the

confiscation of all wealth attributable to mimppropriated
faads* an act that would carry fuU legal weight*
"msappropriated" is Castro's word* and what It was he
meant by its use i$ open to speculation.

He could have

meant it la a rather limited sense* for Instance la
possibly referring to the corruption within the govern*

ment.

In light of the laws that immediately proceeded

this one* however* it is more likely that Castro had a

broader meaning in mind.

He appears to be suggesting

a large scale expropriation of lands by the government,
centrally administered, and distributed to those who

live and work there as opposed to the situation of ab*
aentee owaerahip which then existed*

Castro gives

incraaaiag substance to this Interpretation later in the
speech* stating that the law would define the maximum

amount of land that any person or entity may own for

each kind of u^dartaking*8^
It is with regard to this statement concerning

confiscation of wealth attributable to misappropriated
funds that Castro might be going further than the Orto*
dox© program*

The extent of Ortodoxo redistribution

would be more limited* confined to the acquisition of

idle lands primarily* Castro here is at least talking
about a redelegatloa of resources that is currently
"miaappropiated," which implies a broader meaning then
mmmmmmmmmmmm
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what might be included within the framework of the
0rto4oxc*s policies*

Tha Implication of a more powerful central govern*
ment to be utilized in the capacity of redistribution

amd development can also be found later in the speech.

*# **i !SI^®U<T!? stwwnwamt with the support
SL^?**1?^ and the re**peet of the natlont

S?L£* *&**** «* *** waal and irrupt office*

^i^^S^lC^fff1
industrialize
the country, mobilizing*«??*}***ly
aH inactivetocapital...°4
The plan* he adds* would be submitted for organisation
mM. planning* am activity we would gather as being
ceatrally administered, me revolutionary government
would also solve the rant problem on the island by

lowering rates 30 per cent* and it would completely

reform the educational system*85 Hare for the first
time in tha speech Castro refers to long term goals *
Industrialisation and education specifically. This Is
a slightly different emphasis then could be found earlier

in the speech. Barller it seemed as though the problems
of Cuba could be solved by simply giving "the people"
mm rmi&m of power* for that would be the "just" thing
to do. And am a result of this action* things would
than be fine on tha island. How he demonstrates his
associating some long term goals with the develoi«ant

of a batter way of Ufa. It must be indicated* however*
that he intends for industrialisation mod education to
mmmmmmmmmmm
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aM in providing greater comfort for Cuba1 a citizens

In the short term*

No conception of a more socialist

attitude* the common good, Is implied hare*
Then* after these suggested policy alterations

from those that existed la the Cuba of 1933* Castro*
in tha final portion of his speech* returned to his

initial topic* namely the constitution, aM his tracing
back to liberals of the past* particularly Marti.
Speaking of the constitution* he ways:
A constitution, as we understand it* Is the
fundamental and supreme law of a nation} It
dmUmm the political structure and regulates

the functioning of the^grgans of the state* placing
^*^

*BBwwi»wase mw

vim

*s»>w/ms

A|*^^wawwm smw

The constitution, says Fidel, is not inconsistent with

the revolution* because Article 40 grants the right to

revolt* and second* because the constitution Itself
ham bean betrayed by the Batista government.

87

with

regard to the unjust rule of Batista* Castro then quotes
Martij

« 'The man who conforms to obeying unjust laws

and permits the man who mistreats him to trample the

country in which he was born Is not an honest man***1"88
Toward the mM of the speech, fidel again speaks

of Marti'*
It looked as though his memory would be
extinguished forever, so great was the affront*

But he lives*

He has not died*

m^ a^a)t^sSiam^l to nla memory.5^
mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmimmmmm
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His people arm

We can view accurately in this speech a picture

of fidel Castro in the latter portion of 1953*

Oastro

the liberal continued to shine through to a pronounmd

degree, so much so in fact as to cause embarrassment
for fidel later*

In retrospect* he felt a mmd to defend

what was to appear to be his "moderateness" in light
of his political inclinations years later.
It we had not written this document with

care, if it had bean a more radical program *
though harm it is certain that many people ware

a little skeptical of programs and often did not
give them much attention * tha revolutionary
movement against Batista would not* of course

have gained the breadth that it obtained and
made possible the victory.^
Hils type of retrospective comment by Castro has given
rise to a#eaamtioas of oppwtunlsa by his critics*

It is possible* however, that the speech was at tha
time a truthful auiaaary of f!dslfe political thought*
and that such statements as the one above can be seen

as attempts by Castro to establish greater ideological
consistency with the past than tha evidence suggests
he deserves*

It Is clear in examining the speech that there

warn plenty in its substance to make uneasy "the com*
fortable md conservative sectors*"

The threat of

expropriation was apparently not limited to just Idle

lands* am the Ortodoxo program suggested, and so would
not place the mind of large landowners at ease;

nor

would the specter of tha lowering of reants by 50 pm

cent alt well with landlords*

Jest as the speech gives

us a view of Castro thelliberal, so does it give us
for the first time a peak at Castro the evolving socialist*
Ho doubt Castro shows as not socialist inclinations

Ideologically in the speech.

let he suggests programs

that emphasize a central government with the authority

to restrict rent and to expropriate land, all for the
benefit of the great majority of Cubans who are oppressed*
The policy suggestions are not socialist ones and go

little further than the program of the social-democratic

Ortodexosf

but they do demonstrate a definite break

with liberalism and its concomitant conservative economics*
Wilkerson indicates that the ideas which built

the 26th of July Movement, Castro's revolutionary or*
ganisatlon* and which we find in Fidel's "History" speech,
had ita roots in liberal ImUn American action groups
of the 1920's, particularly those in Peru*

they have inspired have tended to adapt the

practical aspects of {their prograaj7 without
bothering much about the theoretical concepts

from which they were derived.91
55» political thinking of Caatro as exemplified by the
"History" speech and which would soon be the thinking

of the 26th of July Movement can be viewed in light of
past Latin American leftist parties.

To paraphrase

wilkerson, programs are proposed without regard for
those political Ideals that give rise to the formula*

tions in the first place*

Of

7 wilkerson* p* 6*

Consequently* in the case
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at hand* Castro was able to suggest such radical approaches
to Cuba1* problems without feeling a need to modify his
otherwise liberal-oriented rhetorim.

Such would be

characteristic of fidel through his first days of rule
in 1959*

As Fidel entered prison in late 1953 for what

was to be tkp to a twenty year sentence, he was a well

known revolutionary throughout the country* and was
already close to becoming a folk hero of sorts among
lower classes and the youth*

But while he was well

known* it is doubtful that he had a great deal of support
jQr^uva&a** ^P*s»>^**sa*ie**i**<*y w

Castro began to conceive of the 26th of July
Movement apparently while he was in prison*

Hth a

great deal of time at hand to simply think of his poli
tical career* his ideas* and the fate of his country,
his conception of the Cuban revolution developed and
matured during this period.

Fidel's stay in prison was not very long. After

Batlata had been reelected early in 1955t Castro and
other "political" prisoners were freed by executive
clemency in May 1955* This brought to a close one and

a half years in prison for Castro* a period of time
spent in preparation for just such an event*

He would

now embark on the journey that would take him through
revolution to the leadership of his country*
Six weeks after he was let out of prison, fidel

left the Island for Mexico in order to formulate pro
grams and plan strategy for the revolution. The 26th

of July Movement* Castro1 a revolutionary organization
named after the date of the ill-fated attack on Moncada,

was formally launched in the summer of 1955 while in
Mexico*

Brapar indicates that at this point Castro

still considered himself to be an Ortodoxo,

and he

continued to do so until the spring months of 1956*
But his thoughts also were very revolutionary*

Shortly

after leaving prison, he said:
a mere change in command* Cuba erneastly desires
a radical change in even the field of its public

than liberty and democracy in abstract terms*..9*
On August 8* 1955* Fidel's movement issued its
first significant political statement from Mexico,

"Itaifest© So. 1 to the People of Cuba."^ The state*
ment echoed Fidel's Moncada speech in terms of policy
suggestions * redistribution of land among peasants*

broad participation by the workers in profits, immediate
industrialisation by means of a vast plan promoted by
the state, a drastic decrease in rents* and extention
of the educational system*

A new suggestion consistent

with the implications of the Moncada speech was the

nationalisation of public services*

It is significant,

however, that such a move was suggested explicitly here,
as we can recall that the great majority of public utilities
immmmmmmmmmmmmmmammmmm
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were controlled by the United States.

This initiative

was in fact directed toward the expropriation of a

foreiga*4ominated enterprise* a new theme also began
to appear with Manifesto Bo* 1 - the theme of corrupt
government and what to do about it.

"Heorpuilaatlon

of public administration and establishment of administra

tive training" is suggested here, aa la a reorgaaiasatlon
of the judicial branch*

Possibly of some significance in the Manifesto

is the fact that the concepts of freedom and democracy
are here at least not emphasized.

Instead* the revo

lutionary movement is prepared for the great task of

redemption and justice*95 fhe latter has a certain
moralistic tone about it that la mot prasent In the
political terms of freedom and democracy*

Justice

could be Intended to include freedom here* and democracy
also* for that matter*

Nevertheless, the broader mean

ing represented by his use of the words "justice" and
"redemption" might imply a slight movement away from
an implicit liberal orientation*

Of equal importance for our purposes is in noting
Castro's statement regarding elections*

to those who impudaatly advise participa
tion in partial elections as a national solution*
we answert

who is concerned with those elections?

fhe discontent is found* not on the part of the
politicians who seek poets, but in the people
who seek justice*

those who believe that serious

political* social* and economic problems can be

solved byssimply satisfying the appetites of a
hundred or so miserable candidates for a few

95Ibld.* p* 269
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posts as mayors and representatives think very

badly of Cuban citizens. What have petty poll*
ticians given the country in the last fifty

years? Speeches* sinecures* congas, lies* com
promises* deceit* betrayals, improper enrichment
mt a clique of rogn*** empty talk* corruption*
infamy* la do not view politics as the traditional
politicians de*7^

It is true that immediately following this passage was
a portion stating that the only just solution was elections

without Batista,

let what surfaced in the paragraph

above indicates a distrust of elections and traditional

politicians that gees much deeper than a criticism of
only the Batista government.

The traditional Cuban

political system itself seems to be coming under criti

cism*

Although still speaking in basically liberal terms,

Castro was saying that more was needed than simply a
return to the political techniques of the past.- Such
a return to more "petty ponucians" and their "deceit"

and "betrayals"*

This was the Cuban experience*

And

again* we see that the people seek "justice"* according
to fidel*

In its context here* it is clear that justice

definitely might not mean traditional liberal remedies*

Justice, implies Castro, would not be the important—

point for our ymrpisijis thlsi iffuch of what is considered
to be liberal values could be (and ultimately would be

by this revolution) rejected on the grounds that justice
Is not served by their presence.

The following weak* Castro sent a message to

the Congress of Qrtodoxo Militants* in which he concen*
mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm
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trated on declaiming Batista*

Bat here again the subject

of elections appears* As before he acknowledges the
oppositions request for immediate elections* and Castro

keaitatee* "How many months*" fidel asks»"would we
have to wait to see repeated the unpunished treason

of March to?"97 Instead, he Indicates that the Chibas
legacy points to revolution as the solution?8 It is
significant to point out that most other opposition
groups at tha time were in favor elections immediately.
the Ortodoxo tarty had bean bargaining with the

Batista government during this time* and this probably
contributed to Fidel's feeling a new independence from

his formerly trusted party*

Castro had concluded* we

remember* that the moment for negotiation was not present*
In this same massage* Castro indicated that it was sad

to see some of the best men in the party accepting posi
tions in Batlstafs government*

Then, in a statement

that can be considered to be one of Independence from

the Ortodoxos* fidel said that his movement* the 26th

of July* didn't constitute a tendency within the party,

but was the revolutionary apparatus of "Chibaslemo."99
%

the end of 1955* Castro can be viewed as a

pronounced revolutionary still maintaining an essentially

liberal-democratic outlook in the most generalized form,
mmmtmmmm

97Castro, "Message to the Congress of Ortodoxo

Militants" (August 15* 1955)* StTfll^ftHW &£MEl&. P- m<
9%bld*
"ibid** p* **?6*
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although a pervasive emphasis upon the highly moralistic
stance of justice was bagiiHiing to surface*

Also for

the first time Castro is smmn doubting the value of

immediate elections in the attainment of those goals
of his revolutionary thinking.

It is clear that such

a stance was the result of Castro's perception of the

political dominance of freaident Batista* and a reassess
ment on his part of the value of elections in the Cuban

setting, fhe result* his opposition to elections* was
a compromise with his Uboral political philoaophy for
perhaps a greater goal aa ha saw it.

Two portions from the 26th of July Movement's

"Manifesto No. 2 to the People of Cuba*" dated December

10, I955t deserve mentioning, first* the moral super
iority of the leaders of the revolution is argued*
Those of us who lead an austere and poor
life* devoted without rest or respite to the
struggle, giving the country our youth and our
life* working for six million Cubans without

asking i*aything of anyone, we feel that we have

the moral amtherity and courage to speak to the
nation in these terms*100

fhls condescending attitude which surfaces from time

to time in the writings of Castro and his revolutionaries
gives substance to the argument that this revolution

was made by a revolutionary vanguard for the people of
Cuba*

"Here ware a few middle-class students and Intel

lectuals*" says C. Iright Mills*

"la contact with the

tragedy of Cuban poverty and corruption* responding to

it in a revolutionary warn*"101 Matthews characterise*
mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm
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th. aiddl* ei*« ort.nt.ttou of th* relation's l*ad*rs,
•»» a«J*r ax**** that their brtLng appalled by th*
paassnta In th«ir cond*ac*naloii ma partly th* raaooa
for their wanting to r*volutionis* Cuba.102
**• oth*r significant portion of thl* second

•mlfaato regarded how th* wolution m to b* fln*nc*d.
Castro wondered opanly her* .bout this topic, and then
apok* of th* dilemma facing th* aoramoat.

th. JlJ?>Ztifmf$ia* robs * b«k to ?«t funds,

•aScOT*!?froT«lt*d
intiitt.!^Sm b*
eompromis*d b*for* it attainspo*wr.*33
W.d*l returned to this then* on December 25 when h*
indicated *h*t h* thought th* reason iu bagiad th*
e<**rnm*nt»a hunting Mm. "it is du* to my keeping
* fir* lia* of conduct sine* March to, when so many
haw changed their attitad* just as on* changes shirts."'0*

*h* revolution's integrity, he said, cannot be bought.
It ean b* added that th* wolation *r*ntually
found financial support mostly from former political
stronga*a who had l*ft the island either by fore* or
by their own will when Batista took powar. The great
•ajority of thaa li**d in Florida, and war* of a rel*.

tlwOy consarwatiw fraa* of mind, almost all, lik*
**mmmmmmiimmm

mmmmmm

J^h?apert m*mi&Bmmm* p*«.
^^iB^BWT itea^lef p. 233.
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Pr^o Socarree* the president of Cuba at the time of
Batista*s coup, ware ardent supporters of democracy in
the Cuban sense and the Constitution of %9¥>*

their

support financially for Castro was for a liberal demo

crat, and undoubtably the pressure to "compromise" the
revolution, am Fidel puts It* was great*

We will soon

see the beginning of a kind of political moderation on
Castro's part that is not explainablw by anything else
other tHan thits consideration*

The compromises of which we are speaking ware

not apparent in 1956* however*

Fidel1s strongest state

ment to date was Issued on March 19* 1956* the date
that Draper attributes to the 26th of July Movement's
formal break with the Ortodoxo Party,

In the statement.

tidal argues that those who are silent about the revo

lution share the dishonor with those who oppressJ05
The movement is also fighting those opposed to the regime

but are not interested in radical change* he said*
There is little doubt that his attack Is directed par

ticularly at certain leader© of tha Ortodoxo Party who

ware negotiating with Batista*

He is careful to indicate

that the vast majority of rank and file Ortodoxos support
his movement In his judgement. w

Then he constructs

a picture of the 26th of July Movement as developing
from warring factions within the Ortodoxo Party, and
wmmmmmmimmmmmmmmmmmm

tQ%astro* "The 26th of «fuly Movement" (llarch 19*

19%), ft«v9An,ttPfia«rX ftBBffAt* P* ^10.
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says that "It was a movement, which, without violating

the line of independence by Chibas, resolutely accepted

revolutionary action against the regime*"*°7 The best
Ortodoxo* he adds* are beside him waging the revolutionary

struggle.108
Braper is careful to emphasize the extent of

Castro fs break with the Ortodoxo Party in March of

1956 as being organisational and not political*

After

all* as he point out, Castro was still saying that

"***the 26th of July Movement is not something distinct

from the Orthodox!**"109 It appears that the March 19
statement gives Castro fs concurrance with this conclusion*

But it is true that the organisational break* if you
will* was a direct result of Hdel*e perception of the
Ortodoxos betraying their heritage. No longer could

Castro tolerate the prospect of traditional solutions,
that is, through negotiations and compromise with the
regime, as real prospects for solving the problems of
Cuban society.

lidel had stated that the Cuban revolu

tion doesaH compromise with groups of any sort***0
His political expression no longer fit into conventional

channels* like those represented by the Ortodoxo Party.
He was even having increasing difieulty in supporting

t07Ibid*, p. 315.
t08Ibid., p* 318.
draper, (fra^ro,frfflf flhaory £&& £ffl£&g&. P- 10.
110

Castro, "Manifesto No* 1 to the People of Cuba"*
^fTPtettQliam Struggle, p. 2?t *
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the elections

that other opposition groups were suggesting.

Despite claims by fidel that his movement still reflected

the political thoughts of Idwardo Chiba, he and his or
ganization no longer fit well within the established
Ortodoxo framework*

Castro remained in Mexico into the latter portion

of 1956*

From April until November* Castro is seen as

a contradictory figure indeed*

We can hear again Castro's

distractora shouting "opportunism," which seems to be

the only thing that could make sense of the disparities.
The disparities do indeed exist*

For instance* in an

interview in August, Castro says that a government elected

by the people is an "inalienable right*" and something
which the nation demands*

But later in the same

interview* he begins talking about unity with all revo
lutionary forces* then adds that it is better to unite
to demand freedom than to unite and participate in useless elections.

112

How can we balance this second state

ment with regard to Castro's original proclamations
about the value of elections?

In clarification of this

statement* Fidel saysi
Some might think that this declaration implies

a change of tactics on our part* I accept It*
A tactical change la necessary within the revo
lutionary line. It Is foolish to disregard the

lessons of reality* Later we can argue; now.the only honest thing we can do is to fight* •*•*

n^ 11!"totaCT±sw in Mexico" (August 7* 1956), MSSSZ
aawMBwBT fflelHwtf» P« 327*

Ibid,, p. 328*
"ibid*, p* 331•
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Let's try to sort the contradictions apparent
in this interview.

In a moment of candor Castro smmm

to be telling us that elections are at least not useful

under the circumstances present in August 1956*

This

is the case, he says, because the consideration of other

ideals of thm movement, such as the freedom of the people
spoken of here in the most abstract sense, are more

important than other ideals that are ascribed to by the
movement, such as the principle of elections.

Castro

indicates the value and the tightness of elections, yet
they could be counterproductive under the present cir
cumstances,

Sua goals of tha movement, still primarily

of a motivation for bettering materially the people,
ware becoming more uncompromising as time passed*
Principles like expropriation and redistribution of

land* expropriation from the utilltr empires and broader
participation of laborers in profits* among others,

would be nonnegotiable with the rmg$mm$ Caatro foresaw*
At this time the resale thought that they could settle
for nothing less.

Consenting to elections within the

situation present in 1956 would have been a compromise
with tha possible achievement of those goals, and as
Castro dearly saw* a coflipromise with the principles
inherent in their conceptualization of the Cuban revo
lution.

the only difficulty that we have remaining with
the interview given this analysis la Castro's use of
the lord "freedom".

It is a word which he doesn't

33
utilize often* and its ""Witylug here Is not clear*

If

he meant the word -la a sense familiar to Americans, then
clearly the whole interview remains full of contradic—
a^fC' rf%*jh jMk
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|!WNMi1.ffi^f and it is possible that Castro the evolving
socialist had a different meaning entirely intended
for It*

For instance, we have already :&mmn that democracy
in the Cuban setting has not meant freedom, constitutional

guarantees, an impartial j^^^yy* •#?<$ ^NfwiMty* but
Instead it has bean parallelled by corruption, inequal
ities, unemployment, foreign d^sttinatlon* and a lack of
saaotlty for hu**an rights*

*e can conclude that the

concept "freedom" to Castro doesn't Invefee in him aa

Instead, freedom means to him something much
different than our frame of reference permits us to

probaMy pertains to a freedom of the people to pmmm

amd poverty*

PHfjgwiN*ft:f>g Castro's programs that we* have

thus far discussed, freedom means a sort of neo-ttedonistic
«a% ••an^H^e**' ^w
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fill life*

We have also viewed Castro's lip service to the
western conception rations of freedom, like constitu
tional guarantees %nA mm like* but especially since

leaving prison* these views have not been in mm fore*

Sit

froat. As we have seen* Caatro has used the word "Justice"
often in the context of what the people and the movement
want, an exceedingly moralistic term that invokes the

antithesis of what is right and wrong rather than the

mum asmtral western intariratation of freedom being
a state of being.

And finally'* although we have amen Castro's

fowalatloas In terms of bettering the plight of the
individual materially* his conception of freedom must

also include its usage in a more collective smmm* We

hava certainly gained perspective regarding taa American
impact on tha Island In economic* social* and political
sensae. ^rtainly ''Justice11 would not be smnrmdp in
Castro's mind* until Cuba could gala its "freedom" from
its northern neighbor* Tha revolution was ffcr Castro

an acta7 of naUonalistic Independence as wall as an
act of social change.

If Castro's probably conception of freedom can

be aaen in these il^ta* it becomes clear that the goal
of freedom of the people might not bet perceived to be
parallel with that activity which we Immediately associate

with tha term, namely elections. On the contrary,
Caatro viewed immediate elections as an activity dlea*
fcwtrleslly opposed to the attainment of freedom in the

senses described. la terms of his perception of freedom*
he was probably right.

In September 19% the movement took its first

step toward a unified revolutionary opposition by being
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la the announcement of the "Mexico Pact*" fidel advises

other opposition groups to cease their useless function. ^
Tha next document that can give us a glimpse
into the political thinking of fidel Caatro la the
"Program Manifesto of the 26th of July Movement," issued

in November 1956* or Just prior to the time when Castro

left Mexico* * This document provides us with the
opportunity to view for really the first time Castro's

attitude toward the Cuban economic system* partleularly
with regard to the 9*$« impact*

It also demonstrates

jftgy^Tf the remaining liberal tendencies in Castro's

thought!

Fidel would still place ultimate blame for

the plight of Cuba on the latlata regime* and not on
the Waited States, and second, he was unable to conceive
of U.S. non—support of the revolution considering Its
"justness*"

Let us examine it wilh meticulous care*

The Manifesto begins* as so much of Castro's

to demonstrate the deep roots of the revolution.

The

movement declares Itself a continuation of the revolu

tionary tradition of the past* and the struggle taking

place is for "the worthy destiny of Cuba." 6 But
then the new twist is added*

The destiny has been crushed by aa immoral
mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm
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and anti-Cuban power* ** The colonial mentality*
the foreign economic domination, political corrup
tion, and unlimited military control have united
into one* like apocalyptic riders* to impose
a regime of oppression and exploitation* grotes
quely disguised as.a republican government*

upon the country*

f

The tone of the Manifesto Is thus set early in the
opening paragraphs.

W*B* domination has had a large

part In contributing to the plight of Cuba* but the

ultimate blame must rest with the Batista regime* which
is the predominat "anti-Cuban power" that has adversely
affected Cuba's destiny*

A new anti-imperialist theme is hinted* but at
least the liberal-thinking Castro blames most of all
Batista and not the W.S*

The March 10 coup radically suppressed the
law of the land* Arbitrary brute force (which
•s*^e saw** w* w^ w wpa>e *ipwawi^wa^wsifeww mwmm dsees> w wpaa*WMewM*wa wm>aa *a*^atTia*%^*a*v^i^^j^ia^^N'wa>ia*
aaAMkaaa^ •Saf'^B^v^ s
^Ma^ea>atfew#at^H tj *^*
J« • tH
^e%**i*^B*s*Awa> <aanl aiasfesV-aett «i***a*fe^BK.
^*fcs av*ita»s**&^u.
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(home, property, moral integrity, and life)
assured by any civilized society are crushed no
by the brutal weight of the repressive hordes. °
Castro criticizes the American role on the island

elsewhere in the document.

It is not true* he says*

"that the best method of creating more Jobs and the

material well-being of the people is the mxrrmndmr of

the economy to foreign domination."119 But then he
again backs off from pla*»l.fig ultimate blame here*
Basically* this Is not a dispute between

!!7!bid.
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economic theories*

The root of the matter lies

in the government's banditry* anxious to obtain
foreign backing at any price* The govurament

d^* m* hesitate to gain that support in a

criminal and irresponsible manner by surrendering
the economic sovereignty and material wealth of
the country***w

Much later in the document Fidel goes wall out of his
way to clear the Waited States of any direct blame.
He states that the Ideals and Interests of the revolu

tion should be common to all states of America* and

that Cuba's attitude should be one of friendship for

other givarnmenta*^^ including the W**l*la! Although
foreign economic penetration still persists* says Castro*
the term "Imperialism" Is improper in this context*
Fortiiaataly* such a situation can be over
come without damage to any legitimate interest.

Through eonatructive friendship* Cuba can truly
become* as is indicated by a multitude of geo
graphical* economic, and even political factors*

a loyal ally of the great country to the north*
yet at the same time presarve its ability to
control Its own doetiayJ"

Undoubtably the specter of American support in

a substantive way for the Batista regime was a very

real consideration for the revolutionaries* and thus
for them to show open hostilities toward the fnlted

States would have been a questionable tactic*

let it

also seems unlikely that even Castro In 1956 fully
realized the iacompaUbUlty of his program suggestions
and tha "interests" of the W*J*
1

m
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must have seen wondering why it would not be possible

for the W.S* to realize that Cuba would require economic
sovereignty in order that democracy would really work

there* a mealizatlon that would result in U.S. coopera
tion with the revolution.

But was It democracy that fidel was fighting to

establish la late-1956? first he says in this document*
"Let it be clear, the* that we are thinking about a

true revolution."

Soon later ha says* "We want a Just

mmd functional democracy."123 Are these conflicting
statements?

Perhaps not*

Castro provides for us a

partial answer later in the document*
democratic recuperation are closed;

"The paths of
only the dignified

road of unsurrection remains..."12Zf The struggle has
in Castro's mind two phasestdestructive, in that the
former government and system surrounding that govern

ment must be torn downg

and constructive* the building

of a new order*la5 This new order* implies Casta**,
is to be guided by the ideals of democracy* nationalism,

and social Justice.126 What is meant by democracy?
simply "the Jeffersonian philosophy" and the Lincoln

formula of government of* by* and for the people.'2?
In short* Castro creates for us little Ideological

t*3Ibid** p* 115*
Ibid* * p* 125*

'^Ibld** p* 126*
t26Ibid** p* 128*
'Wilkerson, p. 3d* Taken from the document under
study*
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depth with which to work* The microscopic democratic
Jargon remains* but underneath it all was there sub-

atantlve belief or did the words simply constitute a
hollow shell of meaningless Ideological rhetoric? In

view of what took place after Batista stepped down and

the revolutionary government gained power, we might be

led to believe that Castro's opportunism was again apparent*
The question is certainly a difficult one to answer.

There does* however, appear reason to belive that Castro's

belief la the principlee of democracy enunciated at this

time 4i£ go deeper than a superficial dedication - that

is* his devotion to democratic principles were deep
enough;

he Just couldn't perceive the events that were

to follow that would make an immediate passim to actual
democracy truly counterproductive for the attainment of

other more practical goals of the revolution; like the

large scale social changes he was suggesting. These
two streams of thought ** first* the belief in the prin*
ciples of liberal democracy, and second* his supreme
dedication to a reel social revolution on the Island -

ware incompatible given the circumstances* which included
tha economic involvement of a democratic neighbor and

domestic problems which inhibited development* Their
incompatibility did not become wholly apparent to fidel

until 1959* When It became apparent to him1 he altered
his position*

Not long after the issuance of the "Program
Manifesto," Castro and his followers who had bean In

Mexico with him boarded a boat headed for Cuba.

The
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purpose: to begin an immediate insurgency upon landing*
which would result in the successful takeover of the

Cuban govenment.

By combining with organized opposition

forces already on the Island* It was reasoned by Castro
and the others that those aboard the "Granma" could

accomplish the feat*

The "Granma" expedition of November

1956 emdmd in failure, however*

The timing that was

of the utmost importance between those on the boat and

the forces on the island was way off* and the invasion
was crushed easily*

Of the almost one hundred rebels

on board the "Granma", only twelve got away;

three of

mm were Fidel* his brother Boul* and a revolutionary
with Argentine citizenship named Ernesto "Che" Guevara.

The twelve escaped to the Sierra Maestra, a mountain
range in the far eastern portion of Cuba* which would

become tha revolutionaries base of operations for the
next two years*

Our next glimpse of the revolutionaries comes
with Herbert Matthews notable visit to the Sierra in

February t957*

Matthews' visit came at a time when

mams were circulating both on the Island and elsewhere

that Castro was now dead* and the interview which he

had with fidel dispelled those rumors* For omw purposes
here. It is most Important to note Matthews1 impression
regarding the number of revolutionaries in the Sierra

with Castro*

He estimated that the 26th of July's total

number there was about eighteen man*'28 it seems in
credible that this could have been an accurate figure*
"•fig1-'
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******* Mm. teiteim ml Smmlm* 1959-1%6, p. 24.

61

but it la believable*

Months later* Suarez estimates

that the size of the revolutionary force in the Sierra

as being not larger than three hundred;129 other observers
appraised the total size of all of those actively fight-*
ing Batista in May 1957 as not being more than a thousand
spread over the whole Island* but then adds that there

probably ware many more sympathizers,^
The reason for tha importance of our establishing
a realization of the minuteness of tha revolutionary

force la so that we cam more accurately view the apparent
moderation which occurs in Castro's political thought
and tha principles of the revolution during 195?*

After

the "Granma" catastrophe* and the sense of their being
little batter than a negligible revolutionary force
because of their numbers certainly contributed to the

increasing feeling of the nmmd for unity among opposition
forces*

Caatro was still the most wall known revolu*

tionary leader, and he still commanded at least the

greatest following in terms of quiescent dissidents

on the island.

But this was not enough.

It became Increasingly clear that the peasents

alone would not be able to pull off a revolution - despite
their oppressed state that was rmml enough, Castro found
that they could not be mobilized for radical change.
Likewise the workers were not easily organized for

Ibid., p* 26*

!^«Cubai Acase Study of a Successful Attempt to

Seize Political Power by the Application of Unconventional

^l*1*6'" jjffi»tt^ ^SMiUfffJr Jgaliim AMS3£la (v. XII,
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revolutionary expression, a reault of their becoming
a part of the system itself by attaining a degree of

thm prosperity for themselves.

The failure of two

general strikes called by the Sierra rebels* one in

this coacluaioa*
v^vaemv*
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The only strategy loft to the movement
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The necessary condition for Batista1 a overthrow

was the mass desertion of tha middle class, and Castro's

satire political strategy in 1957 and 1958 was designed

to encourage and hasten this process. ^

And so In

order to proaote the broadest possible unity which was

a prerequisite for the overthrow of Batista* the great

moderation of 1957-58 began.

We must remind ourselves

that this is in light of our finding Caatro to be evolv

ing into representing a radical social—democratic stance
mW' w ^Wp

w^aewa

^w^^esa* e*pww

mrwm

ew»aflw

m&m» ws'^i'wawpva*s*>sai0%

<a*#ej»w wp

j

^w*ww*e* Qmi-m

The f-^*ljti definitive expression on record which
exemplified this much more moderate stance for the

pmtpmmas of the unity of the opposition is found in the

Sierr. H.«tra Haattasto of July U, 1957-132 Th. pa*.
poses of this document were twofold:

to promote a

unity of the desperate opposition forces which we have
coma to realize was necessary for the success of the
mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm

w»w»,awaaa>\*waaaaaaaMi> p* ?8*»*_ ^ ^fl*^*K.!*Sl* f0aad ** gm**0* IfffffltttttiaiigT
Struggle> pp. 345-*347.
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movement;

second, to provide a platform that would be

likely to be supportable by numerous groups of the
opposition.

Tha former of course hinged on the latter*

and it was understood that the unity which they sought
would be beat developed by a resumption $t j&aphasls M

libaral-defflocratic emphasis.

Given those purposes,

the Manifesto consequently mMrmasma itself openly to
the necessity of unity, and provides a liberal-democratic
platform on which to base that unity*

Sarly in the document it is indicated that per*
sonal group rivalries have been the greatest weakness

of tha eppeaitioa movement*w The oppeaitioa should
be able to unite on one point* implies the Manifestoi

a common desire to overthrow the Batista regime*^
With this as its basis* the document then bains to
rejoice in certain political Ideals that ware calculated

to make It easier for other factions of the opposition
to unite with tha 26th of July.

"Bo the Sierra Maestra

rebels not want free elections* a democratic regime*
and constitutional government?" we are asked.

This is

why they have fought* we are told**'5 ^# Qi ^0 Maal*
feeto'a guarantees was

To declare under formal promise that the
provisional government will hold the Constitution
Of 1940 and the Electoral Code of 1943 and will

deliver Qe power immediately to the candidates
elected.

I5%bld#, p* 3*A*
*^%bid*» p* 3%5*
1

* p* 39*
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"We want elections*" repeated the Manifesto* "but with
one conditio! truly free* democratic* and impartial

elections*"^
Other proposals and policies of the revoiutloiiary
government ware also enumerated*

Among them were a

guarantee of separation between the military and pon
tics* immediate initiation of a campaign against illi**

teracy, acceleration of industrialization, ahe appoint
ment of a provisional president immediately* and an

absolute guarantee of freedom of the press specifically,
and more generally, a guarantee of political rights.

Immediate appointment of a provisional president before

taking power was given a special emphasis* as was, of
course, the subject of elections.

The emphasis placed upon elections here causes
draper to react in this fashion: "If Caatro

could not

be trusted to carry out this •formal promise*1...it was
hard to know what to trust in the first months of the

irsgimo**138 This conclusion Is particularly accurate
for those with a predisposed unqualified bias for the

sanctity of elections and the democratic process*

One

can't argue win temper that the main goal of this docu
ment smmm to be elections and democracy in the American

liberal sense. But It is difficult to take the step*
am Irmper does, to move to a statement implying that
157

fimAttU°aaEi s^rwAe* p* 345.

l%rapar* Caatyy^i Theo^ aj& Practise, p. 15*
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we can thus agree that the political inclinations

of Castro are not represented for whatever the considera
tion in the Manifesto.

The evidence indicates that the

reason why this document came into being in spite of

this fact lies implicitly w4tfr$fl tha Manifesto itself -

the goal of unity*

It Just happened to be the case

that for any revolution to succeed in Cuba unity was

necessary.

It also happened that those other opposition

groups who could contribute to the cause of overthrowing

Batista, both financially and through insurrectionist

activity* ««* democrats, liberal and ccBasarvative* who
could not support a movement which appeared otherwise

Jjasilaed*

%Mm does not aeeeassri^r ***** that the people

of Cub* on the whole could be amid to be represented

h$ these political <mttoofc»*
***!•*)aa*^**-

^a%*£%Wh'*mft^*Pk'*a*l*eW4P'

JBaWaV**!;
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It does mean* however*
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inclined in that direction.

The dilemma for Castro was clean

compromise

with his ideological Inclinations, eithar truly or making
«m"aw

jgjauh*v****„^B^^B*h4BaB.
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it appear as such, or maintain th* revolutionary thema

that seamed to be progressing toward tha left* and thus

losing fft.1 hope of accomplishing the larger goals of

his relation*

the a^endry la a familiar one for poll*

ties! leaders to be aura* mmd Caatro apparently concluded
that it was bast for ^f to adopt a variant on the former
»M*M**WM*»»a»W*»*ttM*»**a^^

»*W, p. 19,
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Edward Boorstein smms perfectly what fidel was

stance.

beginning to see in late 1956*

Urn problem for the leaders of the levolutien

was to promote the broadest possible unity in
the struggle against Batista without giving up
essentials, or losing the leadership of the
movement. Some weight had to be given to nonrevolutionary groupsj sometimes compromises
had to be statM**
^^

Our peraaptioa of the Sierra Maestra lianife*to

is extremely important for oar purposes in that it dam*
onstrates a decision made by tha revolution's leaders

la order to mmm to terms with very p^Mcally^riented
political realities, i.e. the necessity of organizational

support and monetary backing.

Our preoccupation with

th* document might* howevew* mislead us in regards to
thm actual effect that it had at the time of its distri

bution*

Wilkerson indicates that other than receiving

support from Agramonte, Chibas' successor as head of

th* Crtodtae farty* the Manifesto raoeived little support*1^
She attributes this at iaast partially to a fear on the

part of other opposition groups that their unhesitating
support for mm document might lessen their position

within the r^olationury movement* and do little but
enhance th* prestige of Castro as the leader of the

revolution**^
the only other event which took place in the year

195? that should be pointed out of importance to us
'mmmm0mmmmmmmwmmmmm>mmmmmmm
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^'Boorstein, JQ& Economic ^n^forrwt^n 2l Cuba* p. fo*
i^mm^mmmm .^*^aB«B*«**^B»^i**a*^BBB)B*B*^B*j- m^mm^^m^^^^mmmmmmmW^^mmmmmWWaimmmWSmr WnWSWr aaWSSSlWSfS*^

f«illkar*»nt p. 41,
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was an uprising at the naval base at Cianfuegos, a
ulitefeaae* coordinated between elements within the

a*vy and thm civilian population*!4% As with the cases
of most of ita revolutionary predecessors, however,
the uprising failed* with three hundred being killed*
The event had some significance tor the long-term revo
lutionary struggle because It demonstrated that Batista

could no longer count on the blind support of the millfnat»w.. **«•

Political themes initiated in the Sierra Maestra

Manifesto were continued and expanded upon in Castro's

artlcie of H&vember 1957 entitled "thy We flgkt", and
appearing in Coronet magazine. Wilkerson finds it impor
tant to note a possible relationship between the themes
found in the article and the audience who would be

reading it* namely* Americans.

It is easy to see Ca*tro»e

astute perception of America in tanas of his emphasis

la the artlnl** she says*1*6 the emphases would obviously
be palatable to am American audience.

Castro again

promises elections, and adds that they would be held

mix month* after the taking of power*

He states that the

movement Is fighting for liberty and freedom above aH

els** and is fighting against military rule and police
appreesion.

Then Castro outdoes himself in a statement

concerning "misconceptions" that were arising with

'^Wlth* jgyi mmWm%% ^OOf* P* 31 •
^^bid*

l44^*^soat p* **6

69

regard to the 26th of oJuly Movement's economic progress*
Let me say for the record that we have ao
plana f$r the eraropplation or nationalization
of foreign investments here. True, the extention

of government ownership to certaitt public utilities
so** of them, such a* the power companies, f *S.
ggfcftg *JmmW * point of our earliest programs!
m we have currently suspended all jSanJiiag on
this aatter* I personally have come to feel that

nationalization is a cumbersome instrument*

^g* £*t eeem to make the state any stronger.
y*t It enfeebles private mntmnSBPismm^T^

It

HaUonalization, Caatro eontiaued* would ba counter to

the goal of In^totrialiaaM^ at the fastest possible
rata*

with this article, Castro continues to pursue
the absolute goal of ovarttoowlng Batista in the manner

begun in the Cuban Manifesto*

harp on themes calculated

as not offensive to either the other groups of the oppowl*
lion or toe Waited States,

fhe latter consideration

was obviously more important here* "Be was, of course*

writing to Americans at a time when their support of his
cause was a matter of importance to him*" pointsout

wiikersona**®
to the other hand* we view a fidel slightly more

la line with th* progression in political thinking
than wa pruvioueiy observed in "fhe Cuban Manisfeato"

of September £!* 1957. Here Caatro can be seen as being
eeasidsrahly more willing to include certain program
suggestions from the past than in tha Manifesto.
mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm
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instance, the concept of national sovereignty in relation

to economic independence is indicated, and so is the

promotion of co^arativeso1*9 However* stiimtlation
for foreign investment will be maintained* and a sacred
respect for the constitution and the law is declared,
Castro again stressed an economic theme in another

article appwring in J&ft Jig&Stt to Hovember 30* 1957*."°
Cuba** problems* fidal says here* are related to inda*tri*

alisation, living standards, uammployment, education*
and public health*

He refers to the land ownership

situation, pointing out that more than half of the bast

triable land la in foreign hands*

then finally* In drama

tic conclusion, fidel says that only death frees the
Cuban people from poverty.
It must have bean exceedingly difficult for Fidel

for th* time being to ton* down what were previously

his radical inclinations for the purpose* of overthrowing
Batista*

Certainly soma of his ardent supporters must

have questioned the apparent political moderation in
their leader*

Perhaps of some significance in this regard Is

the publication of the "Program of the 26th of July

Movement" mm viewed by a "Committee of telles and Sympa-

thizers of the 26th of July Movement" in Costa Hica.151
mmmmmmmmmmmmmmm

Wcerletoa Beels* "Cuban Manifesto," fhe Hafcitni.

v» 185* September ai* 1957* Inside cover*

,5%fdel Caatro* "that Cuban1a lebala want*" The

asmwawfe •* ««♦ Sovtmber 30* 1957* pp» 399*401.
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As can be seen in the reprint below, this groups1 per
ception of the program of Castro's movement in late
1957 was little different from what we would have con-

cluded;to be affair representation of its program in 19%.
<

?V-jS^e'ija^HB^.of the 26th of July Movement
S?if*>| HatidkyfC^^^ibY^bulletin published in Costa Rica by the Costa Rica*

l.^'^Cff^fm^ee^fEi^ies and Sympathizers of the 26th of July Movement) ,

^^/7,/Owfcefsmp of"tlieiMand tolhe granted to all tenant farmers occupying
/|>*jceb^ofUe^^tnaf|il70ka«re!i. Trie state will indemnify the former owncri
^i^. the basis ofctfce trots which the lands would draw in ten years.
'_• £ I'" &• LabweW*Wd ernpIoyees,-wilf he granted 30 per cent of the profits
^•f all indu**tia!,*WrfJ3nti!e and mining enterprises, including sugar refineries.
1EtjterpVi»e»^W^ichk are" exclusively agricultural would be exempted in con*
'^deration'of thp lawsfo be enacted dealing specifically with agriculture.

'-i ^"3:-)Bug»t'farjners jtobe. granted the right to 55 per cent of the price of

.Bapf^cane^g^oWd jn^•*»ga/> mills, and a minimum quota of 500 tons will

\3>*/ awarded to alPsugar farmers established more than three years. [This
inpans that-5f# torts of |tie sugar quota assigned Cuba by the International

Sugar CoundUwo«I^ Nave to come from the crops of small farmers, who

*^usually depend^ttft^eing, ahlj to help fill a quota only after the large planta

tions have, sold^Jmeir'crops. Sugar mills normally prefer to deal with large-

' icale opeiat9i«Vpnl3^.^Typical recent crops have been of the order of five

^trillion tons.**—tfanslqtof.)l^*.' Vvii<; . .':, •
^ •••'
.•^4 \ .4. Confiscation .{of ^he,,.fortunes of the grafters and embezzlers in all

i previous governments^ jind horn their assigns and heirs by means of special

^ tribunalwi$h: lull- access'to all sources of investigation; and the audit, for

"*theae purpows, of the*^books of/all stock companies registered in the country
^^T operating iA,it,,and the soliciting from foreign governments the extradi

tion of persons ^nd5the impounding of funds. Half of all funds recovered
'^wiMild be applied'to, soaai security, the other half to hospitals, asylums and

s-'fer^mt^hoiifi^V*/V+ / ••>• ':

'

/^'V;15.1 In international/affairs, the establishment of close solidarity with the

^'(^eittoiwatic^BatMHisSfOf^the American continents. Persons persecuted for

'tpotitjcakieasons^by the, tyrannies which oppress sister nations will find in
v C*U>a.generous'asyhim^brotherhood and bread.
".f>j,'».6. The,,enactment 'of fundamental laws and measures necessary for

1. agricultural and^educational reform; the nationalization of the electric and

^lephone* trust?!,; coupled .with a return to the public treasury of all raxes

•wed by tKrcompanies i|ow operating these services, as well as of all illegally
• t*asmaive income j:hey have garnered through their rates.
mmimmm**+mdmmmmp*^iUm»<£*Trm!i "* __ "<"•
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*The document of course signifies that there were still

man^v of Castro's followers whol still believed in the
26th ^pf July's program as conceived prior to 1957•
V

What's\jnore, these Castro sympathizers believed that
these.were still the political and social aims of the

revolutib&Y^ this discovery gives us tremendous confi
dence -to conclude with Wilkerson and others that Castro's

12

supposed moderation was fallacious, and the appearance

of the same was eatlrely due to the political considera
tion which we have enumerated.

Thm results of these diverse political initiative*

by Castro and members of hia organiisatioa in 1957,
which we have discussed were visible in the differing
perception* apparent of the ievolutionary aoveaeat*

Although prior to 1957 the movement had not developed
a eoapletoly coherent political ideology within which
It could operate, the effects of the movements' devel

opment in 1957 were confusion with regard to what the

*i€th of July really etood for*

It practically could

atand for anything that onefa subjective mind wished
it to atand for*

Observers rears later would character

ize the movement aa lacking a unifying ideology and
political theory, a reflection* they would say* of the

movements' varied class content*15^ uqTq correctly,
it happened just in reverse of this*

A uniftriag poli

tical theory may have been evolving, however slowly
prior to 1997*

that process was interrupted by the need

for diverse popular support for the aosemnt. a need

which precluded the final cohesive development of such
a theory.

The unity that was achieved as a result of Castro's

'compromise of the revolution" was tenuous, and its
elements less than confident concerning the unity*

,52Banachea and Valdoi* atSfc &A-%WtlttftUt PP* 76~7<
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Some thought typically like one Jules Dubois when he

said, "fhe 26th of July Movement has never stated that
11 will, socialise or nationalise industries*

This has

been stated only by those that stupidly fear our revo

lution* ••"" Others, lite the aeney men who were now
perhaps differentlyt

"They have to worry whether Castro

has really discarded the socialist beliefs that he held

earlier, including drastic land reforms and nationalise**

tlon of U.S.-owned power companies."*-* Still others
were even acre suspicious, as this observer indicates!

"Ton think you say see, out of the corner of your eye,
a red flag waving*

But when you look directly at the

spot, it's disappeared."*™
As 1957 past, the movement thus found Itself

espousing on the whole more moderate polities than it
had a year earlier, although we have seen instances
where not even this generalisation has seemed safe*
It is accurate to still view Fidel Castro as the most

important actor in our look at the year 1958. the final
one of the revolutionary struggle for power.

"It was

within his power," says Matthews referring to Castre,

"to gave the revolution, to a considerable extent*, the
mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmBmmmm
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Economic Research
*s*a Study on Cuba* The Cuban Econo

Project (Coral Gables, Flat 1965), p* &26*

^fhe first tear of Rebellion." £&a£# •• 70,
December 9, 1957, p* kh*

155Lee Balli "Inside Rebel Cuba With Raul Castro,"
Life, v* **5« July Hi, 1958. p* 32*
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direction* the pace, the Use and the intensity that
it has taken."156
The year can best be summarized as being one

where an increasing amoun£ of repression on the part

of Batista brought an aawmentation in revolutionary,
which, of course, again caused even greater repressive

activities by the government. Such was the plan of
fidel1 a organisations

Caatro*a guerilla tactics* then aimed not
so much at •defeating1 the enemy as at inducing
hia to loss his head, tight terror with counter*
terror on the largest possible scale, and make
Htm intolerable for the ordinary eitlaea*TOr

Batista fell headlong into this reasoned progression,
ifcich resulted in his fall*

ilUaately, Batista1 a

overthrow was largely due to the desertion of his middle

class backing* Batista defeated himself*158
The situation on the Island had gotten much

worse by March 1958* The relative prosperity which
had been present over the course of the previous two
or three years was beginning to be eroded, and Batista's
increasingly harsh tactics in dealing with insurrectionists
were not popular.

Whatever support that Batista had

had with the people had definitely suffered, one observer
wrote in March 1958 that "fhe central fact facing Batista

this week was that a majority of the Cuban people now

l56Matthewst She Cuban Story, p* 135m

^Brapor* SifJB&i Pfittwttfti* P- *5*
!5%bid*, p* 14*
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appeared to sympathise with rebel Castro."159
The increasing savage of the Batista regime prompted
a declaration of "total war" against tyranny by Castro

mm announced over radio on March 12, 1958.

Also on

this occasion* Castro called for a general strike to
occur the following month in order to demonstrate the
popular support for the revolution*

The month of April is important to us in two

rmgmrds*

first was the failure of the general strike

on April 9* and second was the suspension of armament
shipments from the United States to the Cuban government.

mmmmfmr indicates that the strike was promoted

by the rebels because "Victory was foreseen through
the vastly larger resistance movement in the cities,

overwhelmingly middle class in composition."160 The
plan way have been sound* but apparently the organiza

tion of the strike wasn't* and the events of April 9

turned into nothing less than a "total fiasco".161
The strike failed simply because the middle class couldn't

carry it off**62 Economic conditions were still just
too good in urban areas for such a show of revolutionary
support to succeed.

The failure of the general strike again indicated

59,»The Squeeze in Cuba," Newsweek. v» 81, March
*7* *958* p* 5£*
160

Draper, ^^ry'g Ifrfrttlwltoafr P* 12*

Suarez, p. 2$*

162Draper, £*fi£fi2i£ BffTfaVttHifat P» ***

76

the reluctance on the part of urban workers to support
revolution**? activity.

Their middle class orientation

as yet would not permit them to support the movement*
Bad Castro's movement seemed even more radical than it

appeared to be in early 1958* their reluctance would
have presumably been greater*
Increased government terrorism was the mark of

the period immediately following the ill-fated general

strike*

Perhaps the Batista regime was houyed by the

prospect of eliminating Castro and his rebels once and

for all, now that the failure of the general strike made

it appear that the oppositions' strength was apparently
illusory*

The government's activities* however* were

so appalling that the U.S. government cut off all ship*
meats of military equipment to the regime* a blow to
the regime* if not fatal* it was at least enough to

blow new life into the opposition*

No longer would

the might of the United States be at the disposal of
Batista*

%

early Only the erosive elements within the

regime's power base began to appear* and a couple of
weeks later Castro was able to predict that in half
a year the government's army would completely disinte

grates forecast which turned out to be quite accurate
indeed*

We have already seen the immediate circumstances

of the downfall of Batistai his hand-picked successor

,63Catro* Bfy^t^najry Strj^si^, p* M3*

winning the election on November 3, Batista's fleeing
the country due to unrest in the first hours of 1959*
and finally a week of jubilation capped by the ascension
to power of fidel Castro*

Before proceeding to the next portion of the
paper* let us examine two or three instances which

indicate the theoretical and ideological progression

of Fidel in 1958*

It is interesting to note that fidel

seemed to feel less a need for espousing traditional
democratic values to the extent that he had the previous
year*

In fact* we can distinguish a slight return

to an emphasis upon the revolutionary goals more char*

acteristic of Castro in 1956*

One of the significant

reasons for this stance might have resulted from the

tremendous decrease in friction between rival opposition

groups* a lessening in tensions which resulted in the
"Unity Manifesto of the Sierra Maeetra," signed in July

20* 1958*

The document united the opposition forces

on only three points*

of insurrection;

adoption of the common strategy

that after taking power a brief pro-

iisional government would be established in order to
establish lull constitutional and democratic rights;

and the provisional governmental program would include
the punishment of guilty parties related to the Batista

regime* ^
Perhaps with the unity of the movement within

6^Castro, "Unity Manifesto of the Sierra Maestra,"
(July 20* 1958)* ^fWtoWMfy S&0&&&&> P- 387.
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his grasp, Castro felt less tied to the rhetorical com

promises apparent in 1957, snd more able to develop
his own "left~of-»liberal" thinking withcmt fearing he'd

lose control of the movement* and the revolution*

pies to a less degree during the fall of 1958*

For

A parti*

cular Indication of this trend can be found in a proe~

lamation issued from the Sierra on October 10* 1958*

entitled "Concerning the Peasants' Rights to Land." 65
The premise of this document* as one might expect, is
that the land should be owned by those tilling it*

The program suggested then is explicitly described!

two cabs (i.e* caballerias* \3*k hectares) of land would
be granted by the government to all farmers not owning

property, with the government paying indeamification to
previous owners*

The state would furnish seeds and

implements to new owners*

And finally* expropriations

did necessarily require a priori cash indemmification.

After almost a years absence* which included a number

of denials concerning the "threat" of expropriation*
Castro once again was proclaiming an active government
role for the purposes of aHowUig people the chance of

%riUa*V **w BAmm mm^/H9tBJmCTP\* VJLtS aa VJLal uWBKrv*ll«XV

TflUllvO JLU

1956.

And so, in tit* first w**k of January 1959* this
mm$mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm

<A discussion of this document found in A

S^u4y on Cuba,* The Cuban Economic lesearch Project* pp* 666-7.
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revolution without a doctrine, as Matthews calls it,
achieved power*

Those backing the new revolutionary

government, and they included virtually all of the
Cuban citizency who weren't directly connected with the

Batista regime* varied from being socialists to oldstyle liberals like Socirras.

All could sight instances

most ignored those statements of Castro's with which

they would have disagreed*

It didn't matter to Castro*

The only accounting that he valued* he said* was in

public opinion**6 certainly he was getting the high
marks here*

Besides* he says* the revolution "is in

the hands of a new generation and not In the hands of
those who would like to chain its destiny to a dishonorable

It is in conclusion pertaining to that which
we have covered so far that the course travelled M

Castro's political thought from 1948-1958 begin with a
frame of mind typical of a Latin American social demo**

crat.

He began to view the problems of Cuba in somewhat

more radical terms* in that certain social structures
within the Cuban system were to blame for the situation*

As this change in thought transpired* paralleled and
reinorced by the reign of a dictatorial* corrupt bureau

crat, Castro'a political thoughts could no longer fit

66Castro, "Reply to the State Department*" (October
**0* *7^0/* SmWmSSmwS^BBmmWSiSL SmmmTmwEASmM' P* "^C*

167

"Interview with Bnrique Mineses, %Y°.itiU0nflrY

Struggle, p. if17.
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into conventional modes of expression* and he turned
to clandestine activities*

The evolving revolutionary

tendencies corresponded to a retention of$oae traditional

democratic valuea, showing that Castro did not conceptua

lize the difficulty of attaining revolutionary change
by way of democratic means* given the pre-revolutionary
situation in Cuba*

fidel did not see that the fnlted

States9 influence on the island* together with the
improprieties resulting from the country's economic

situation, would not be receptive to the radical changes
that he had in mind*

As Castro's movement progressed in its develop

ment, fidel came to realise that success of the goals

of the revolution* to which he subscribed* would necessi

tate a superficial compromise with these very principles
in order to gain a needed unity with the revolutionary
groups less inclined toward the left than they*
move was largely successful*

The

After there existed a

substantive unity* Castro was inclined to move away

from his sompromise stance slightly* and a deemphasis
Of liberal jargon was demonstrated.

Far left programs

were now being explicitly stated again.

came to power*

And then Castro

Finally* it is important to note that

throughout the struggle for power* Castro felt little
need for ideological justification.

As an afterward to our discussion of the years

prior to the revolutionary takeover* we must point out
two groups which ware somewhat notable in their absence
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from active participation in the revolution up to this
time*

The first of these, the working class, has bean

alluded to previously*

Their inaction* we remember*

was most easily observed regarding the proposed general
strike of 1957 and 1958*

It has also been indicated

why workers played such a manor role*

They had become

a privileged class of sorts during the reign of Batista,

end so long as the economy was on the upswing* which
i was through 1957, they comprised something far less
than a revolutionary class*

One observer viewing the

revolution in November 1958 thought that Castro had
no chance of achieving power unless he could gain the

support of the trade unions.168 This simply was not
a requirement* as Castro's takeover less than two months

later indicates*

Once it was realized that the working

class couldn't be relied upon as participants in the
revolution* they were viewed as a portion of the middle
class;

and the goal of the revolution regarding these

groups was just one of neutralization*

The other group that participated in less than
an active way in the revolution to this point was the
P.S.P., also known as the Communist Party of Cuba*

•tone digression is necessary at this point regarding
their participation in Cuban politics historically*
The Cuban Communist Party had been in existence

since 1934, and its primary founder* Bias Boca* was

168"Bullets at the Ballot*" fhe E£Q*m±at± v. 189*

November 8* 1958* p» 1*99*

^^ <•**««*—•*
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still the party's leader when Castro fmrnght for and
gained power in the late 1950»s*

Thm Comwatists had

had remarkable success in working from within the corrupt
^*WflWWaWI»T^a»ea? WH|aMS*i^p4aW

mWaw

WMWawWe

W jJF^^^m*

SW

mauMnia

j/jrmm
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^mmS^St—T

SSSmjfta»

mP^tmmmV mVmm ^|F*S*}

of the island's largest labor union until a psrgm of the

naioa in t9%6 W the government blocked open partieip**
tion there by party officials.

After that time* the

way* and was mM.m to maintain a very active working
relationship with Batista etM. his government in the
1950's*

The fruits of this friendliness ware seen in

the better maftes and working conditions of the working

class* a significant proportion of whom were either
mmVd0<mrr7ing members of the jwty or Communist sympa**
thissrs*

with a record of such success in working within

the established system* we might surmise a difficulty

for the party to support a revolution on the island*
This, combined with the Stalinist orientation of the

party, combined for such am effect* In iflatthews' words*
the Communists simply jumped on the bandwagon of revolution very late*

And once on the "bandwagon" *

perhaps by late~1957» they can best be viewed as a
moderating influence on the revolution*

This is a par**

"Some Communists had claimed membership to
approach 20*000 in the mid**1950*s, while the CIA estimated
mere to be 10*000 members and about 20,000 sympathizers.

Sighted in Smith, jQgg Fourth Floor* p. 33.

'*Wt*-«, P. 80.
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ticularly important point to remember* this was the
»le that the party was to f©How over the entire course
of time approached t*y this study* As an example in
***** P*e*1959 period* it has been indicated that as

Iste as m& 1957 the P.&+P* was in opposition to any
insurrecUonarywtactica carried oa in the name of the

revolution*171 In another instance* mumper relates a
letter of the party's dated February 2B9 1957* which
sapressed "radical disagreement with the tactics and

liana" pat forward by Castro*172 The Communist tactical
approach was more aOTropriataly represented by strikes*
demoastmfcioae* and protests*173
At least two Communist leaders warm more in a

Castrolst vamw - Carlos Rafael lodrigi*e* end Cesar

Itealaate* 7* Rodri^ez was the leader of ayounger*
second generaUon group within the party tfc*i was mere
leftist* and less Stalinist in orientation than ware

Boca and the controllers of the party* Bodri^ue* and
those that he represented ware far mora receptive to
Cfcatre than was the party generally* In fact* he even
tually grew a beard* and fought in the Sierra for Castro
in the last months of mm insurrection*

Thm tttrning point in CastreM3o*a*unlst relations
f7t

cn« ***!Ji*9UfT$! m i8fiaB4 S**8**** Aa sua

?"»"* Smmxaim mm m smmsa* p. 30,
i7hh3A.t p.. 86.
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came in the summer of 1958 whan the unity packs among
the opposition movement were Ming signed*

Tha pact

demonstrated the support of the party for Castro's revo

lutionary struggle, and his methods*

The only apparent

reason that Castro sought the P.S.F*«s support, which

he did* seems to be that he only wanted to unite the

opposition forces of the left* of which the Communist

Party had recently become a member.175
In short, to describe the Communist Party's in

volvement in the revolution as insignificant prior to
1959 is probably if anything m overstatement.

More

importantly with regard to our understanding the socialist

evolvement of the Cuban revolution, we must J&tf view
the (kansuniste' "impact" on mm revolution, if it can
be called that, as being of a moderating influence.

Fantastie as it might seem* the Communist party continued

in this role weU after January 1, 1959* em we will soon
see.

Any analysis regarding the revolution's movement

toward socialism must keep this tmt in mind, because
as a result of this realization, the Cuban Communist
Party* like the workers, are unlikely choices in our

attempt to find the forces behind Castro's evwlvement,
and revolutionary Cuba's evolvement, toward socialism.
We can now see dearly that the roots for this

socialist progression can be found early in Castro's

political career* and then developed in terms of their
expression from there*

But these roots of which we speak

mmmmmmmmm
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''-'Matthews, p. 120.
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were not of a socialist nature themselves. The primary
point of Castro's poliUcal development up to this time
is his consistant dedicaUon to a time social revolution

for Cuba that found its expression not in Ideological

developments* but in predominantly specific proposals
concerning the development of a better life for the

people of Cuba.

It was this then which was emphasised

more than any other during this pre-1959 period* with
the only exception being the period of moderation which

occurred in 1957.

All other values* be they the glorl-

fication of eleetions or the exaltation of constitutional

government* awere subservient to this goal*

Changes

must take place* he seemed to be saying* but we need
not consider with what Ideology those changes conformed.

Ideological justification was sought* as we will see*
only after the program of the revolution began to fit
into a consistent ideological pattern*

The first years of the revolutionary government
can be viewed as a year of definitive socialist devel
opment in the political thoughts of fidel Castro.

It

is here that we view for the first time thoseppolicies
which we have construed as being the goals of the revo

lution* gaining a socialist expression* both in the
policy initiatives of the regime and in its rhetoric*

The time period which we are approaching* namely the

years 1959 and i960* arm not as difficult from an analy

tical standpoint regarding our subject than was the period

of time which we have thus far covered* For one thing*
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we now can view actual policy initiations* something which
ww could not of course do before because of the faet

that the revolutionaries did not hold power*

In the

policies of tha first two years of the Castro regime
we will be able to clearly see an expression of definite

socialist tendencies, and the tendencies will appear
daring the first months of 1959* The first portion of
this chapter will deal with these policies.
The second section of the chapter will deal with

two external influences that played a very important
part with regard to our subject.

We have seen how

great the influence of the United States was during the
pre*^revolutionary years in the economic* social* and
political realms*

Tha declining economic involvement

of the e**S** a situation forced by the arising reaction
to policies of the revolutionary government, caused the

American "presence" to be felt even moro#

Opposition

to the Cuban government by the U.S. began with economic

sanctions against the island and protests concerning
the course of the revolution*

It gained expression in

increasingly volitile ways* and Cuban fears of American

military intervention, ridiculous as that seemed at the

time* were substantiated to a considerable dmgrmm by
the Bay of Pigs fiasco of April 1961*

we will view the

impaci of an antagonistic U.S. foreign policy on the
inland* and how this may have contributed to Castro's
leftward movement*

The other external influence on the evolvement

of the revolution was contributed by the foreign Communists.
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!e will see a growing dependency of Cuba on the Soviet

Union in economic and political ways during this period*
at least partially the result of the pressure-inclosed

foreign policy of the United States. The impact of this
virtual dependency in the domestic political realm on

the island is unclear, but nevertheless we will approach
this subject also*

Tha only dat« with which we could raally work
ap until this point has been related to theoretical

formulations by Castro and the 26th of •July Movement*
and what ideological framework for the movement which

wa have been able to construct has been gingerly based
mpoa maim em mfidmom* In the final portion of this
chapter* we wiU trace the rhetorical utterances over
the course of the two years under study* and thereby
contribute to our understanding the revelation's evolve
ment toward socialism* So let's begin our look into the
policies initiated by the regime for the years 1959
and I960.

As the revolmtlonary government assumed power in
January 1959, it must first be noted that Castro himself
ked no official position within the governmental structure
A man named Manuel Urrutia was made president. Urrutia
was dmOewmd to be the president designite of the Cuban

involution almost a year earlier, and the revolutionary
leadership followed through with the pledge. Urrutia1 s
background is enlightening in terms of its pronounced
liberal-democratic orientation* Morray characterizes
him as being the conservative champion of the eonstitu-*
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tion and a firm believer in the independence of the

judiciary.176 Urrutia was a judge who gained prominence
in Castro's way of thinking in his defending the right
to rebellion against Batista in the early days of the
revolution*

"It was because Urrutia was a conservative*

not a revolutionary* that he had defended Castro's right
177

of insurrection against Batista*" Morray indicates. "
Then he continues*

Urrutia regarded It as his responsibility
to the nation to moderate tha radical lnsurrectionaries who had won the civil war* like the

bourgeois property minded Girondists of the French
Revolution, who had tamed against their Jacobin
allies after helping them to overthrow the ling*
Urrutia was anxious to brake the Revolution before
it went to extremes. As his Prime Minister,

Urrutia appointed another true-formed Girondist,
^oss* Mirer Cardona*f *°

Cardona was the president of the Havana Bar Association

prior to the revolution and shared generally the same
political outlook that Urrutia possessed*
It seems likely that these two unquestioned

believers in the democratic system were appointed to

these positions* ostensibly by Castro, because they were
seen as true allies in the revolutionary struggle that

was now to begin.

If we can assume this* then there

appears little indication that when the revolutionary
government was formed* the rebels of the Sierra Maestra

thoumfcfet their views to be incompatible with democrats

*7Storray* p* 10*
l77Ibid*

!78Ibid.
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1U. ***** mm <*rdona. la othar ^W- of tfc.
differences between Castro and his democratic appointees
in terms of the direction that the revolution should take
was not perceived by fidel* nor probably by most others
in Cuba at the time*

Castro4 s Ilberal«*iemeermtie utter*

ences were real enough, they might say*

But what was

not perceptible by Castro, that is the ineompaUbility

within his own political thinking regarding his democratic

ideals and radical goals* was certainly not seen by
democrats like Urrutia and Cardona.

Castro's official position at this time was leader

of the 26th of July Movement and commander-in-chief of

the rebel army. These positions entitled Castro, cer~
tainly by design* to maintain his control over the course
of the revolution*

The reason he chose

a no more

public position from the beginning* such as Prims Minister*
oan probably be trased to his prior commitment indicated

numerously that he sought no rewards for his revolutionary

services* A "fundamental source of his power*" as Suarez

pits it* was Castro's personal prestige with the peo|>le*f79
This source was great indeed* but it is difficult to
really pereeivw the degree of power derived in such

a way*

nevertheless* Castro's relationship with the

people was me of a folk-hero, and he most certainly
was a legend of sorts with them*

And the people seemed ready for changes*

'^Snares* p# 33*

Even
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the middle class, indicates Draper, was ready for deep
180

feforms* w

T*seetime tor changes was ripe, and the revolt**

tionary government was ready to interpret this will into

policies*

The only remaining Ingredient for an apparently

smooth alteration of the old order was the people's trust

in their new government.

This* also* was forthcoming*

The Cuban peasant* for example* "does know that for the

first time in Cuban history a government cares for him* wants

to help Ma, and Is helping hW181 Th* process ahowd ovidence of contributing toward its continuation also*

In

the words of Boorstein, the revolution Itself began to rev

olutionize the people. °*
With the moment right for changes of a significant
nature* the new revolutionary government went to work in

January*

Initial steps of the regime included the dissolv

ing of Congress* with the legislative function being trans

ferred to a newly constituted Council of Ministers} civil
courts were suspended* beeause it was thought that these

contained Batista sympathizers; the role of the rebel army
was expanded* and it eventually "maintained and strengthened

the links with the people that had first been forged in the

Sierra*"'®* ^ immediate initiation was taken in the field
of education on January 11 when it was decreed by the govern**

180

'^Draper, fttifiyy's; flajPJJlu.Uftn, p* 20*

!81Matthews, p* 112.
182

p* 20.

!83Ibld.t p* 39*
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ment that all academic titles granted Before 1956 by pri
vate universities were void*

Perhaps more significantly,

as soon am Castro came to power,electric companies were
intervened by the government.

This was tha first of the

"nationalisation" decrees, althaugh total nationalization

of the Industry did mot take place mmtil the summer of

1960.

AIM* Law #17, dated January 16* ordered the confis

cation of all construction equipment which had worked on
public projects.

We can wee that the government in Janu

ary was certainly taking m active stance regarding con

fiscations.

Also in January the government bwgan what was

to become a long series of monetary interventions on its

part that would culminate in an economy almost entirely

controlled by the governmentt on January 6* the national
Bank prohibited withdrawls from private vaults and deposit
This was aimed primarily at those who had been un

books.

der the favor of Batista.1SZf Furthwr, exchange of 1500
and $1000 bills warn prohibited* and confiscation of the
contents of safety deposit boxes was authorized.

And oa

January 26t 1959* it was ordjred that all banks would ab

stain from giving interest on time deposits* ^
Perhaps tha time was right for changes, but some of

these Initiatives,

particularly the monetary ones* must

have forced to the surface from some quarters a degree of
skepticism regarding the constitutional intentions of the

revolutionary regime*

Even in the first month of rule* we

mmmmmmmmmm*

ject* p*
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can see clearly policy initiations that seemed to ran coun

ter to the values of liberal democracy.

We have by no

means sighted all of the decrees promoted by the govern

ment in its first month of rale* but the intent of the rev*
olution even from what we have briefly smm indicated that

the rebeV intentions were toward the purpose of a radical
transformation of society, not just the reeetablishment of

the old system with simplyaa more rigidly obeyed constitu
tion and a more honest leadership*
Reactions to these first series of reforms were

quite favorable.186 Matty within the population had much to
gain from the implementation of these equalization de
crees initiated early in 1959*

Of course* there were those

who could not support many of the actions because tha rev*

olutlonary laws* soma of them being indicated above* were
obviously affecting their positions adversely*

These types

left the revolution early* states Mills* because the revol
ution started to affedt their pocketbooke and their boar*

geols hearts*187
The month of February saw Castro's ascension to the

position of Prime Minister.

The primary reason for this

move* preceeded by Cardonafs step-down, is open to question.

Snares suggests that it might have been the result of pros*
sure exerted by the far-leftists within the regime for the
development of a greater dmgrem of revolutionary leader*

^Bobert Taber."Castro's Revolution," Thm Ration.

v* 190* Jaanary 23$ i960* p* 67/

tt7Miiis, iffcitfii Tiiafettf p* 48*
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bat this guess is little more than idle specula

At any rate* by the end of Fehmuary, tha new Cuban

government not nnly now had fidel Castro himself as its

Prime Minister* it also had ons less liberal—democrat with*
in its ranks*

Also dwing this time* a fiscal system within which

istry of Finance*

view*

The resultant system is anlightening to

It generally designed methods that would obtain rev*

enue from all kinds of income earners*

It established a higher scale of taiteif in
some cases* out atvtne same time* it established

exemptions and reductions in those cases in wM/*h
the tax might affect new investments or in which, the

Similarly* tax on profits were reduced from a previous 50

par cent to a maw level of 410 per cent.1'0 And other stim
uli to private investments were apparent* such as the allow*
ance of accelerated depreciation in some instances* and

deductions of profits put at 50 per cent if an endeavor

aa. pare*!™, to b. ^ the aattoa* infra**."'
This fiscal system developed by the Ministry
of Finance indicates at least two things of significanet

first* that not all of the thinking within the regime

was of a socialist inclination in early 19591

second*

that sack considerations apparent here indicate a degree
M***a**»*a*»aa»B**»»*»*»a*»x*«*^
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Snares§ p* *i3«

'a ««*•*<«. ^n cuoe^, Tne Cuban Economic Besearcn

Project* p* 656.
1
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of toleration of that entity which could best supply the
wmdmd capital spoken of, that being the United States*

This latter observation may indicate that the prospects

tor Cuba of a peaceful and friendly situation concerning
the U.S. seemed impossible to attain to thm Castro regime
at t&iLw 'time*

At the other end of the spectrum there ware early

indications that pointed to the extent to which the
government was willing to go in its role as initiators
of change in Cuban society.

The law of March 10 decreed

a 50 per cent reduction in all rents that ware presently
exceeding on the island 1100 per month*

tee could take

the cynical view of this as being obviously politically

discreet reductions for Castro, but we should also remem
ber that Castro had suggested the proposal long before.
Government's tampering with the vary liberal

tradition of the institution of private property was
also demonstrated a few weeks later with Law Bo. 218

of April 7, 1959.

This decree forced owners of property

in urban areas which was deemed as not being in use to
sell their "vacant lots*"

Taken together with the rent

reduction law* these decrees did not bring with it the

end of the capitalist road in Cuba, but it did offer* a

The Agrarian Reform, issued on May 17* 1959*

192See for instance. £ Study on Cuba.p. 726t
"Rent constitutes an important
important element ofme family

budget* and lends itself to measures of public interest."

*9%orray,

p* 25*
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brought a realization of the worst fears of the land

lords, says Marray*191* Mndmr tha law* land would be
expropriated from private owners if they owned in excess

of 999 mm** The land that was expropriated would be

paid for hr thm government tn beads* payable in twenty
years,

part of this land would be given outright to

wharwarowwra» renters* and landless peasant* which
wotUd constitute the private agriculural sector*

Most

importantly* for our parposes* the remainder of the newly
acquired land would be placed into cooperatives.

These

were to be modelled after the Soviet "kolkhozi," with the
pm&mm being organized by the state and ©omtroHed

by aa adminstration provided for that purpose.195
Hit idea of cooperative newer really took hold* thon#i*
and this portion of agricultural production became

under the direct auspices of the government.196
Hie law fmtim created a^pic^taral development
zones, which was another administrative device*

The

IKRA, which was proclaimed to be the government's over
seer of those things falling under tha Agrarian Reform

mm i to organize, diraet* and orient cultivation of

land in the zonesj to regulate agrtcultaral production
tii^orajdly in private lands; to offer assistance wher
ever necessary*

and to be in charge of rural life

mmm$mwmmmmmmmmmm

'** P* 53?

195Carmelo
Meso-Lago* ^ isAaw factor and a**********
son in Cuba (New ImmJ^ofl iL.su ^ ^ *««****»-»**••

*^
«!^flbW8f?*ttoa *•»**# ^ocialisff mmm
% frih^
(sew
torki 1969), p» lit*
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gtiisfally* including the a*eas of education* healthy and

housmmt. 97 needless to say* the powers granted to INRA
mm great even within the law* and HtBA didn't necessarily
always ftectioa within toe guidelines. The Cuban Economic
lesserch Project indiaates that even these very broad
pmms ware transgressed hy %WA to the extent that the

fmimt wonders "whatoer the Agrarian timtvm Urn was

mm meant to be compiled with*"198
The purposes of the law hs&m come under study
varioua Mass* and mem exists a dlfferwnee of opinion*
This is an important question for om purposes also*
mm with its remedy might come an insight into mm regime's
socialist inclinations in mid-1959. Draper claims* for
instanoe* that the revelation^ leaders pat forth a
Proposal not pmdmx&nmtml? iaconsiatamt with that which
warn suggested by them prior to taking power* they moved

to mora active direet govejrament participation later*
In other words, Draper is saying that again we can view
deceptions regarding the actual aims of the Castro

government* «C<^activi»atiiin''* he saya*v would have

8$x*n thm game ama^*,t,99ta agreement with Draper is
The Cuban Economic Research Project* "The lam seemed*
in retrospect, only an expedient to permit toe total
Communiasattei of land* property* and agriciiltttTa! prom
tBHimmmmmmmimmmmmmmimm

l97IMda* p* 670*
***!*** fBllMillllll Theory an
wm^mv^^WW^^^mm^^aW^^^^^>. .•mmmmWaMmmmSmmmmW '|(|Smm!

^^anaohaa end Valdez, pf W®,
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mmmtimUm.****
On the contrary* others have mrgamd that direct
government intervention in toe form of collectivisation

was not a pmrpom of the law originally*
...it would be an error to suggest that toe
creation of cooperatives was a consciously taken

political first step toward ulterior state control
of agriculture. A careful reading of toe texts
shows wall that toe revolutionary leaders who wrote

the law did not conceive of tha cooperatives as a
form of state-run enterprise.201

And continuing* it is added that "In practice* and contrary
to the explicit intentions of the law* toe cooperatives

sector became very quickly closely dependent upon the

state*"^^
It seems apparent that our advantage of knowing
what was to take place soon after toe law's initiation

work* to our disadvantage here.

Surely the law seams*

looking at it retrospectively, as a plan meant to be trans*
greased in view of toe process of collectivization that
was to take place.

But it seems unlikely that such was

the aim of toe government while constructing the law*

The

document itself should not be viewed as an explicitly so

cialist one.

The largest amount of the land expropriation

under the terms of toe law were to go to private owners
created oat of the disadvantaged classes who presently
worked the land bat did not own it*

A reinforcement of

capitalist enterprise is not toe initiation of socialism*

200

A Study on Cuba, p. 670.
Bonachea and Valdez, p* 2%3*

^^hld** p* 2kk<

So in Its initial form, toe Agrarian Reform Law was not
socialist oriented*

A possible reason for a fairly rapid switch to col*

lectivization ravar than fully deploying toe idea of coop
eratives which retained private ownership may have been a
result of a consideration of productlwa quotas.

We've seen

that during this same period a planning agency had sag*
gested tax breaks for investors for toe goal of develop*
ment.

Perhaps the goal of increased agricultural produc

tion on the part of toe government can shed some light for
ns here.

With the prospect of numerous relatively small

farmers making ap a substantial proportion of the agri
cultural sector* it seams likely that the government soon
fait toe need for utilising the most productive means a*
vailable, so as to counterbalance toe slight loss in effia

dency that woulJ inevitably result from a peHey promoting
numerous small farms.

As we remember* tha private sector

was to exist aide by aide with the cooperatives,

it might

have become clear over toe course of 1959 that a more pro*
ductive partner to the promotion of private fans would be
toe initiation of a government controlled farm sector even

mora involved than would have bean tha casa under the coop

erative format*

The fact that State Items did not replace

the less government controlled cooperatives until 1960 is
evidence pointing to this conclusion.

Although the Agrarian Reform Law was generally a
non-socialist document* toe importance of extensive govern

mental Intervention in agricultural production established
a precedent• Even larger governmental participation in the
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economy would soon take place that would acquire socialist
characteristics*

Opposition began to appear among some of the lib*
eral supporters of the regime regarding the Agrarian Re
form Law*

They were arguing that the law had even gone

beyond the proclamations of the rebels whentthey were In

the Sierra Maestra, as indeed they had*

Seren cabinet

members resigned as a result of the dispute over the law*

The law* and the arousal of disapproval which it

invoked in many* also had effects on Castro,

There was

no doubt in his mind that the great majority of Cubans

were benefitted significantly by toe Agrarian Reform* and
that the law was most certainly consistent with toose pol

icy suggestions first mentioned in his Moncada speech*
Moderation of the goals of the revolution, he thought,

must not take place in response to controversy*

Castro

addressed himself to this question on another occasion.
At times one asks oneself if there ara any
Cubans...who do not understand that in a revolution

ary process as deep as shis one that there is no
middle road*

Who do not understand that a revolu

tionary process like this one readies its goal of
the country sinks in an abyss* Who do not under*

a hundred* that a relapse would be the worst fate*
toe most unworthy that could happent to a country
like this one* I ask myself whether or not they
realise that after the blood that has flowed and

after the enormous damage done to the country by
toe crominals who have robbed it there can be no

possible middle way between.the triumph and the
failure of toe revolution.20*

The evidence began to point to this attitude in Castro
shortly after tie initiation of the Agrarian Reform*

^^Wilkersont p. 53*

"Cas-
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tro interpreted all criticism wihhin his government as op
position to the agrarian law* which in turn became a dis

loyalty to the government or'counterrevolutionary*"*20^
By June 1959 the regime began defining as "counterrevolu

tionary acts" activities which it deemed as threatening to

the revolution*205
The Land Reform Law of May 17 can be seen as a

close continuation of the plans initiated in the Agrarian

Reform*
acres*

The decree inclided the expropriation of 2*300*000
It set a minimum amount of land which could be

owned by any one person or firm*

It is important to note*

though* that it also sat a minimum of land which could be
owned* an actiontthat was hoped to prevent excessive frag

mentation which would hinder production*206 In the same
vein* certain exceptions were placed into the law regarding

land expropriation*

For instance* farms whose production

was 50 per cent higher than the national average were ex

empted from tha confiscations* as ware

cattle ranches

whose production was just better than the average per ranch

production*207 All of this of course was fortthe purpose
of not compromising the goal of increased production with
those goals of the social revolution*

The Land Reform al

so treated foreign iandholdings no different from those of
domestic ownership*

The goal of eliminating foreign inter-

^Ibid** p* 60*
^A mmmkmZ M mmlmmU P* 737*
**WaF

^^Bonachea and ¥aldem* p* 239*

20W

^Ibid** p* 2kQ.
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ests from the island was left for other laws to deal with
later in toe year*

President Urrutia was ousted from his office in

Inly* and he was raplaoed by Br* Osvaldo Berticoa in full

support of tha Council of Miniteters. The event signalled

clearly that which tha policies issued earlier in tha year
had begun to suggest *» that an increasingly leftist ten*

dency on toa part of tha government was now taking place*
Although not well known* Dorticos was a Communist, and as
such was toa first member of toa P&W to occupy a prominent

position in Castro's government*208
Two more significant appointments were made during

toe latter portion of 1959. In October Raul Castro* Fidel's
brother* was appointed to the position of Minister of tha
Armed Forces, and in November Che Guevara was named Presi

dent of toa Hational Bank of Cuba. Bafortaaataly space does
not permit an in depth analysis of toe ideological pmr*
spectives of these two revolutionaries. Suffice it to say*
as one obsever did* that Fides himself was not as "left

ist11 as ware Raul and Che*209 and in this 'light their ap*
pointmants in late*1959 ware significant* much in the smmm
way as the appointment of Borticos was a couple of months
before.

One other event of the fall of 1959 deserves our

attention * toe eireumstaness surrtntnding the prosecution
mmm

208

A mmmmmm. M 2mm&* P* ^32*
P . a a^kM
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of Herbert Matos*

Matos had been in the revolutionary

movement since March 1958* and had proved himself to be a
competent military man* and was made military commander of

Camaguay province before the seizure of power*
him in that capacity in October 1959*

Wa find

Matos had become

increasingly uneasy regarding what he viewed as a Commu

nist infiltration of the government.

Raul Castro's appoint

ment to the post of Minister ofttoe Armed Forces confirmed

his appraheaeions* and on October 19* he resigned from his
position* stating that he could no longer support a regime
that was Communist inspired*

Matos was correctly perceived

by Castro as being a threat to his regime* tor Matos

seemed to have some support in Camagaey province*2*0
Shortly after toe resignation, leaflets were dropped over

Havana proclaiming that Castro was a Communist* and that the
government was infiltrated by numerous Communists.

In re

sponse to toe Matos threat* Castro moved decisively,

On

October 2i^ Castro's forces successfully arrested him* and
after a abort iriai Matos was imprisoned. The rapidity of
Fidel's response in this circumstance demonstrates the de
gree of threat to which Castro attributed to the situation.

A sympathizer with the revolution* J.P. Morray*

providas as clearly with the Castrolst position regarding
tola incident! "Hubert Matos want to jail a martyr for the
rich, the conservatives, the liberals, and the antiCommunist social democrats.
mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm

2*%coray* p* 64.

But for the masses he went to
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jail a traitor."

211

Shortly after Matos' arrest* Castro

staged a public rally in Havana to demonstrate tha people's

support for his actions* For our purposes, two related
points are particularly significant here*

First* this was

the first time that there took place to any large degsee
a violation of basic personal guarantees in a western lib
eral sense| in this instance, toe violation regarded the

right to due process of the law*

Second, in a more general

sense* a conceptualization of the inherent illegality of
actions which were deemed to bw counterrevolutionary by

the government was demonstrated*

"We do not guarantee to

anyone the right to conspire against the people, to make

counter-revolution*" Casta© would say*

Morray defends
tii

this premise! "It is progressive in the 20

century to

protect the advocacy of abolition of the despotism of cap

ital over labor* and then to suppress advocacy of a return

totthe despotism." * An analogous situation, amys Morray*
would be "denying expropriated slave-owners the freedom to

organise a recovery ♦*«"2*^ Considering the goals of the
revolution and their increasingly liftist expression* and
toe threatening presence of the U.S. as we will later ex
amine, it is possible that Morray was correct,

Early in 1960* the pace of expropriation under the
Agrarian and tmnd Reforms accelerated tremendously*
m$mmmmmmmm»m^mmmmmmmmmmmm

Ibid., p. 65•

xbid,, p. 126*

2l%id*
^Ibid., p. 120.
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propriaUon came slowly for the first months of their au

thority - about 850*000 hectares had bean confiscated, and
only 40,000 of those had been redistributed to individuals

through December I939.

Compare this six month total with

a one weak total of expropriations in January 1960* whan

600*000 hectares were taken by toe government.215 Part
of toa reason for this drastic increase in pursuing toe
fulfillment of the decrees was a government reaction to the

opposition of large cattle men to toa first phases of tha

new policies. After toe first confiscations* this group
retmed to deal with small farmers whose positions they owed
to toe government, that is* theiw resulted a boycott of toa
newly constituted small farmers*

"For tha first time." say

Bonachea and Valdaz, "it was necessary to disregard the

formal stipulation of toe law*"216 The gowernment began
buying beef from toa small cattle men in order to keep tha
prices up. than began expropriating mora lands on which

tha governments cattle could gaaze.217
And a centrallizing tendency inevitably paralleled

tha incr**ae in eoaflaeatioaa and coUecUvlzatlon*.218
Tha initiation of a central planning board* "JUCEPLAN",
was an example of collectivization promoting a growing bur*
'WPsawaV^aa*•aa»*^jr a

Despite this increase in the expropriation pace*

2l%eaawfeea and Valdez, p. 2k2*
ibid** p. 2»&*
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it has been indicated that most U.S. investors on tha is

land were willing to hang on as long as they could.219
This was May.

In July the government passed a law initia

ting tha expropriation of all foreign owned enterprises.

Storting around August toe Castro regime began making things
more difficult for the domestic owned firms.

A law was pro*

nounced whifch made it mora difficult for an enterprise to
continue at a prifit.

The tax situation was revised re*

garding corporate profits*

It must have been presumed by

toe revolutionary regime that large firms would be unable

to cope with the adverse tax situation, resulting in tieir

being taken over by toe government*2^ Than in September
a massive string of nationalization decrees ensued.

On

September 15, toa cigar and cigarrette companies were ta

ken over, On the 17th» banks owned by the fnlted States were
seised*

Nationalisation of Cuban banks proceeded on Octo

ber 13, and on toe same day* 332 specific business enter*

prises ware also taken over*
warn accompanied %

owners.

%

Most of these expropriations

no indemnificationf for toa former

October 13* almost toe entire Cuban bourgeoisie

had been wiped oat by nationalization.221 Finally* on Oc
tober 2k> toa remainder of U.S. owned property on the is*
land was confiscated.

%

the sad of toe yemr$ the evolvement toward social-

mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm

2,9IWLd,» p. 642.
******%*&+ Companiss Hang On in Cuba,"

28, 1960* p* 1%3*

'A Stuflv on Cflftf. p. 657*
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ism of Castro's regime was complete* at least in terms of
their policies.

80 per cent of industrial capacity was

now socialized, while only smaller plants remained in

private hands*

The state also controlled toe country's

banking system* its railroads* posts, airlines* department

stores* caalnoes* movie houses* cafeterias, and bars.222
In addition* 30 per cent of tha country's farms had been
nationalized, and these included most of tha best lands*

Although it had not been announced officially, and would

not be until toe following year* says Boorstein* Cuba had

become a socialist country in f960«*"
It can also be added that in policies other than

those related to nationalization tha Castro regime demon*

strated bayond a doubt the depth of their socialist in*

clinations. Socialist emulation, "a method in the building
of socialism based on toe maximum activity of the labor

masses*" using Guevara's words, was also begun in I960*
for example*

Tha system consists of rawarding small num

bers of workers by presenting them as an example for the

Mat*

1 is* again in Guevara1 s words* "a weapon to in*

crease production and an instrument to elevate the conscience

of the masses*ff22^ The emulation system attempts to elim*
inate, or at beast deemphaal**** toa need for material in
centives.

Certain resignations from the government daring toe

22%ooratain* p* 32.
^Wa***ie* p* 129*
2%bid** p* 129*
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coarse of I960 also Indicated the now obvious trend toward

socialism*

Davfd Salvador, who had been the prominent la*

bor man within the 26th of July* resigned from his posi
tion as leader of Cuba'a largest union in March.

By the

end of the year he was arrested tor counterrevolutionary

activity*

Other similar occurances also took place*

An

dres Suarez tells as that

It cannot be doubted that these resignations
and repacements affected the discontent of toe July

26 Movement with a policy that continued to insist
time steadily_tightened Cuba's ties with toe Com
munist world»**^

Throughout the year* a radical change came over Cu
ba, as the government began to make good on its promise of
providing "a real revolution" for the Cuban people*

In

1959 the government seemed to give hints regarding their

progression towaWsocialism, but the policy decisions dur
ing that year seemed to stfp just short of initiating a
true socialist revolution.

This was probably dme to a num

ber of factors, which included the requirement of Castro's
own ultimate rejection of liberal-democratic values for

the parposes of pursuing in its stead a more profound and

radical revolution.

In I960* toe revolution gained steam*

aad a radical transformation of the Cuban societal order

really started taking place*
Two topics now await our analysis*

first* what was

the impact of toe ever present foreign pressure* exerted
directly and primarily by the United States* and less dir*

* p* 96.
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ectly by the Soviet Union, have on this socialist evolve
ment that we have just examined?

diate subject*

That will be our imme

And second, what was the theoretical thrust

of Castro's rhetoric during 1959 and I960?

We have mentioned time and again the involvement of

the United States on the Island of Cuba*

Many have indi

cated their perception of the tremendous degree of that in
volvement by proclaiming that the United States was a con-

tributiong force, and for some the primary force, in push
ing the new Cuban regime toward its friendship with the
Soviet Union* and toward its socialist policies,

"...if

Cuba is dominated by Communism today," said Kingsiey Mar
tin in 1961* "that is in large part the direct result of

American policy."22^ Morray tells us that the revolution
was accelerated by U.S. attempts to stop it.227 As the
self-proclaimed viice of the Cuban revolutionary, C.
Wright Mills said "Sometimes, these days, we feel

that

you ar* forcing ua to eay 'Cuba, ail Tank.*. no!'"228
And Edward Boorstein: "If the United States had not acted

so violently to land reform and the expansion of trade with
the socialist countries, the Revolution would have devel

oped somewhat less quickly."229 And finally* there is
Castro himself, indicating that we may have arrived at a

226Kingsley Martin. "Fidel Castro's Cuba," The Hew

Statesman* v* 61, April 21, 1961, p. 614*

^i.P. Morray, p. 94.

228*ms,Msta^2aa^,p.97.
^Boorstein, The Economic Transformation of Cuba,
P* 33*
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rare moment of consensus among observers and revolutionary
participants alike*

"It can be said that the policy of the

United States is accelerating the radicalissation process
of revolutionary movements not only in Cuba but throughout

the world*"230
Virtually an can agree that the U.S. impact on

the Island after 1959 was one of quietening Cuba's socalled "radicalization," and its consequent move toward
socialism and toe Communist bloc*

determine toe extant of the impact.

It is more difficult to

Surely the U.S. trade

boycott of I960 pished the island into finding viable tra

ding partners* and the *5*S* political policies Mgarding
toe Castro regime forced Fidel to find powerful allies in

order to preserve security.

The more difficult question

remainsi to wfcat extent did the circumstances of 1959 and

I960 that ware precipitated by U.S. foreign policy impel
Castro's Cuba toward socialism?

In October 1958* Castro said that it was toe de

sire of the movement to establish the best and friendli

est relations with toe United States**51 He would have
hmmn tha first to admit that this was going to be a diffi

cult task*

Castro* as we remember* was trying to deny in

some instances that his movement still had pland for expro
priating the island*s public utilities* and enterprise
like many controlled primarily by U.S. interests, bit the

^'♦Playboy Interview! Fidel Castro,** p* 62.

^Castro* "A Beply to the State Department" (Oe*
tober 26* 1958)* p^U^o^r ISaal&f P. 432.
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State Department was still skeptical*

Tha Castroists

could view easily the coziness of Ambassador Smith with

Batista, and Smith's anti-Castro declamations warm well

known among the rebels*

Above all* as Williams points out,

"The United States sought toa prompt and permanent pad*
fication of the island vmdmr circumstances that would in*
sure military control of toa island and that would facil

itate and Sm&mgmrd United stated economic predominance**^2
Sulli circumstances would indeed not be contributory for toa
waging of a radical revolution,

"given tha proximity of the

l.S. to Cuba and its influence on Cuban affairs* toe imple
mentation of a social revelation in Cuba was an extract**

dianrjly delicate task..."23-'
In January 1959 toa United States was game to give

Castro a chance to prove himself to be a sensible and prag
matic democrat and not an irresponsible radical.

It warn

one of the first to recognize and establish diplomatic
relations with toe new Cuban regime.

Even as lata aa toe

spring of 1959* toa revolutionary regime's first ^mmr in
power, Cuba was negotiating to buy f9 million in destroy*
mm from thm U.S.

But it was not long before it was indi

cated in increasingly rigid language by American officials
that tha course of tha revolution wacs unacceptable to the

United States.

After toa initiation of toa Agrarian He*

form* in June the U.S. State Department issued a terse note

of regret regarding toa revolutionary actions* and regret-

M

k

Appleman Williams, "The Influence of toe

Unitdd States on toa Development of Modern Cuba," p, 188*

^%»area* p» 64«
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tiig that toe new government had not consulted with Amer-

lean motors b.**. prculgaUn^ tha u*T.*»
It is obvious that normal relation^ between Cuba and

toa United States ware impossible given two factors: first*
the fairly radical approach toward change by the revolutdom,
and second, the negative attitude of toe U.S. regarding

those proposed changes.

Intthe final analysis* those

things perceived by the State Department mm being in tha

interests of the U.S. ware too integrally involved with

Cuba for the former to be able aa acdept activities on toa
part of the Caban government toat ware deployed in toa name
of social revolution and sovereignty.

In toa summer of 1959* after Castro's order of
^*m*m^mmm-~-*l&t^wW^m&mV
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While most in

Cuba sensed little military threat from toa United States,
despite evidence of a developing hiatility toward toe Cu
ban government, one inflaantial revolutionary at least* Che
Guevara, indicated a fear of dirct U.S. military inter

vention.255 Suarez informs us that Cuba felt great diffi
culty in finding arms smellers* as toa American influence
mmmmmVmmfmm
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began to look toward toa only source

of arms not reached by American influence - toe Soviet
Jl*6

Union.'^-^

And so began Cuba's relationship with toa

mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm

2^!oorsteln* p# 26#
^*Baawam* p* t*£.

^%hid»* p* ft*

Russians, a relationship which weald indeed become

gral in toa months to coma*

intern

It is important to note that

before toa summer of 1959* the revolutionary regime had

received no help from toe Soviets*^7
Hostilities continued to #ow during the massive

government land expropriation that took place in January

I960*

U.S. Ambassador Phillip Bonsai delivered a note to

toe seizure and occupation of land and build
ings of United States citizens without court or*
dars mmd frequently without any written authori
zation whatever, toa confiscation and removal of

equipment, toe seizure of cattle* toe cutting and
removal of timber, toa plowing under of pastures*,
all without the consent of the American owners.oo

Despite toa protests, toa expropriations continued, and toa
ambassador was finally called home on January 21 *
The relations between toa revolutionary regime and

toa U.S. took a drastic tarn for the worse in toa first

months of i960.

After a year in power, it was certainly

becoming clear that the Cuban regime was not measuring up
to toa stoadards for which toa United States was hoping*

Hot only was expropriation now out of hand in the eyes of
toa Stite Department, but also Cuba was turning toward the
Russians while demeaning its former trading "partnes" as

an imperialist aggressor.

Up to toe beginning of actual

sanctions against tha Castro regime, it is claimed* toe U.S.
had bean "super-hxaaanly long suffering;" but now American

patience was ^mamring razor thin."239
mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm
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The first actual point of direct confrontation be

tween tha U.S. and toa Castro regime came with a dispute
with the oil companies on toe island in early 1960* Wa
can remember toat American and British companies controlled

toa entire petroleum industry in Cuba.

Tha oil which they

processed came, of course, exclusively from tie United States*

Revolutionary Caba began to have other ideas of where they
should be getting their oil.

We will see toa development

of this conflict a little later, one which sat off a pro*
mm of reprisals

on both aides culminating in a U.S.

tamdm embargo on toe island.

Butywe must examine toa events

in toa order toat they happened*
A spedal emissary from toe Soviet Union, Anastas

Mikoyan, visited toa island on February k* I960*

The ini

tial relationship between Cuba and Russia had been estab*

lished the previous year in toe way of Cuba's purchase of
military aid*

But now Mikoyan came on a different sort of

mmmmmmSBmUmwAm S

Mikoyan saluted tha Cubans in their desire for

independence.

He made independance a real possi

bility by offering Cabana m alternative market for

their products and an alternative source ofocajd- P. n
tal* toa two indispensibias of economic liberation.**^
The proposal seemed attractive to toa revolutionary

regime.

They knew toat no true revolution could take place until
economic independence was achieved.

Andalso, considering

toe growing hostile atmospnere between aaba and toe United
States, for its own protection ii seemed that toa estab

lishment of alternative sources of imports was vital

* P* 93*

far

11%

toe islands well-being if their primary source of goods,
acquired fawm the U.S., were to be cat off*

In a more specific realm* the Soviets presented Cu

lm with a second possible supplier of petroleumj it would
be cheaper toantthat which was currently being bought from
toe Unite States* and also, the Soviets were willing to re

ceive their payment in Cuban goods.^' Additionally, the
Soviets offered to buy 425.000 tons of sugar In i960 and

a million tons in each of the following years.^
Cuba agreed to both of these trading plans*

important to emphasise

It is

that such moves did not result

from toa socialist shift in terms of Cuaa now transfer*

ring itself to an orbit around the Soviet Union*
much

It is

more correct to say that economic sovereignty be

ing a prfmary goal of the evolution* they saw as being
exptremly important the discovery of alternative trading

partners.

Nevertheless, the U.S. interpreted tha move as

another piece of evidence that Castro a,*i4 ft^# government

were Communidt inspired, which of course meant that they
were an mtmaj of toe United States*

Indeed, they were an

enemy of American domination of the island*

After the trade agreement was signed with the So

viets* there warm first indications that Cuba would cut
cown on its dependency with the U.S.

On March 2* in a

volatile speech by newly appointed president of the Hation*
al Bank Guevara, tha feeling was indicated that the U.S.

1960, p* **06*

^'Suarea* p* 84*
2**2fbid*
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preferential sugar quota was a from of slavery. ^
Then there was more provocative language jfein the island
on March 4.

A freightor from France carrying a shipment

of goods to the island exploded in Havana Harbor.
Cuba accused the U.S. of engineering the demolition of

the boat, a charge which seemed on the surface ridi
culous.

The charge, however, gained some substance by

the obervation that the U.S. at least covertly was

par

ticipating in activities designeddto overthrow th©
Castro regime.

"Freedom" planes, flown by Cuban exiles,

were being passing over Cuba after taking off from
Florida, and dropping leaflets over the island proclaiming

their dissidence toward the revolutionj

The U.S. seemed

unwilling to stop these flights. ^
And it was becoming clear that U.S. was indeed

running short on "patience*"

Also in March a U.S.

Congressman, Larry Brock of Nebraska, said of Castro:

"It's about time we took a big stick to him." *** One
observer wondered how Cuba could possibly turn on the

United Stotes, considering that "For more than a century
the United States lias been sending money, men, ideas,
.

* ..

.

,

246

and above all, confidence in the future to Latin America. ^

243 Draper, Castroism? Theory and Practice* p* 143*

2^f"Wild Marksmanship," The Economist* v. 194,
March 12, I960, p* 978.

2Xf%alsey, p. 162.
^Dickey Chapelle, "Cuba - One Year After,"

ler's Digest a v. 76, January I960, p. 68.
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Then he adds typically, "Hope for the start of real stabi
lization awaits the day when the new rulers shave off

their wiskers, psychologically if not literally, and
buckle down to the prosaic chore of providing political

and economic order."^
The moves toward establishing economic relations

with other countriis continued, and the trend was definitely
primarily in the direction of the Soviet bloc.

A reason

for trade with the Communists to predominate Cuba's new
trading patterns goes back again to U.S. policy and

its sphere of influence.

Few western nations were willing

to break with the cool American policy toward the Island

so close to its home, so as with the acquiring of military
good, Cuba could turn nowhere else.

A substantiation for

this argument can be seen in Cuba's immediate establish
ment of trade with at least one western nation that was

willing, that country being Japan.^ U.S. reaction to
Cuba's newly attempted economic independence, however,
was already signalling tTiings that would come a matter

of months later.

As soon as early 1960, it was becoming

clear that the Soviets and Bast Europeans were becoming

the keys to Cuba's economic development.^^
The first shipment of Soviet crude oil arrived

on the island on April 19, i960.

A process of events

^Ibid., p. 74.

^Boorstein, p. 72.
^Elizabeth Sutherland, ^

(New YorkJ 1%9), p. 165.
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than followed which resulted in toe first definitive

action taken by the U.S. against revolutionary Cuba.

The three primary crude oil companies on the island*
too of them American owned and ons of them British owned,

refnmed to process toa oil purchased from the Soviet
Union*

Not long after this refusal, toe Cuban govern*

meat began to "intervene" toe refineries.

On June 19*

toa Texaco refinery was seised* followed on July 1
by the seizures of toa Bsso refinery and toa British
owaad Shell refinery.

This was simply too much to take

as far as toe United States was concerned, aad only two

days later, Congress passed aMll granting to toe President
authority for catting toa Cuban sugar quita.

On July 7*

President Eisenhower suspended the sugar quota for the
remainder of toa year.

This period was no doubt a turning point for Cuba
and the Castro regime*

Morray tails as toat toa regime's

dispute with toe oil companies moved Cuba toward toe

Soviets mmd also toward socialism.250 This was probably
toa case*

The Soviato ware certainly now more integrally

involved with toe island than aver before*

As saon

ss May I960* only three months after Mikoyan's Initial
visit* 60 per cent of Cuba's imports came from Communist

countries.251 Chi July 8* the day after toa cancellation
of toa smer quota* Khrushchev issued a statement sayingt

^Morray* p. 100*
251 "Cuba's Economic Gamble," The Economist, v. I98*
January at* 1961* p* 147*
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"I should like to call attention to toe fact that the
United States now obviously plans perfidious criminal

steps against toe Caban people."252 Soma have character*
ized tola period as a new ssrvitoda an toa part of Caba
toward toa Soviets, bat this can be doubted.

"Having

just thrown off American control of their economy Cuba's
leaders are not prepared to take orders from anybody

else," said 2^ fin £eja*j2li£?55
It is also undoubtable toat toe events of tha

spring and summer of I960 pushed the Castro regime toward
socialism to an extent.

Expropriation of private enter

prises had not taken place before toe problem with the
oil companies. Previous to this event the only dominait
socialist tendencies demonstrated by toe regime were

the aatproprtotloa of toa island^ pablic utilities
immediately upon assuring power ( a move even the U.S.
didn't express much objection to)* and toa astabliali*
ment of soma government controlled stats farms with

regard to toe Agrarian Reform Law. But by toe fall*
after toa antagoaiaas between Cuba and tha United States

had reached great proportions and toa U.S. initiated
its economic sanctlons,the Cuban government began its
massive nationalisation policy.

So toa problems with toa petroleum companies

followed by the suspension of toe Cuban sapor quota did
mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm

2^Boorstsla* p. 30*

253i*ea*tw and toe^Ceamuniats*'' £& 2ej| £ajai]^>
v* lift* »** 3C» I960* P* 8*
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move Cuba toward socialism.

In realizing the validity

of this argument, we must be careful to find ourselves

not saying that these events precipitated socialism in
Cuba.

Again, we can sight the trends toward sociaHaa

on the island apparent before the development of these
events in I960, such as the two unumerated above*
The rest of the summer of I960 saw an increase

in Cuban trade relations with Communist countries, corre
sponded by more pronounced verbal attacks by Khrushchev

and the Cuban regime on the United States*

In midWuly,

the Soviets agreed to purchase 700,000 tons of the suspended
Cuban miser quota.

Weopen shipments arrived from the

U.S.S.H, and Czechoslovakia, while trade talks were
being initiated with Communist China*

Neanwhile* Khrush

chev was threatening the ^*B. with a retaliation of

rockets if the U.S. would intervene militarily in Cuba.
Castro himself gives us evidence that the trade

connections with the Soviets had effects upon the Cuban
regime*

The connections that we estabHatted with the
U.S.S.B* in I960 very much matured the minds of
both the people and the leaders of the revolution*
Undoubtably, it taught us something we had not
clearly understood at the beginning: that our
true allies, the only ones that could help us

make our own revolution, were none other than

PCy

those countries that had recently had their own.*-**

The Castro regime formerly nationalizedthe remainder
of American owned property in Cuba, totalling *750

million, on August 6.^ And the chain of retaliation

25^"Playboy Interview, Fidel Castro," p. 62.
2^Hulsey, p. 164*
I
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continued with the U.S. initiation of an embargo on

aU exports to the island in October.

"Officially, the

State Department insists that the embargo is imposed
•reluctantly1 In order to fdefend the legitimate interests

of this country1 against the aggressive economic policies

of the Cuban government.M^ However, the embargo1®
long range purposes went beyond this * it was hoped that
the economic pressure would force the Cuban people

against Castro.^-^
Undeniably the loss in trade with the United

States placWcuba in a difficult situation indeed*
fhe embargo's effects were apparent quickly♦

Before

the md of the year, shortages in spare mechanical parts
for the predominantly American machines and motors on

the island were a problem*

it has been reported that

several sugar mills were even dismantled in order to

provide the spare parts needed for operation of the

others. ^

Shortages in raw materials and chemical

products also exsued, m the mining industry, it is said,

was particularly affected*259 3y the end of I960, it
was clear that the embargo had dealt a blow to the Cuban

economy*

And &s the economic situation got worse on the

island in 1961, U.S. imperialism was blamed for the state

*.*
* ^%q^??t±n*JZ*
October
22, I960, p. 350. Cub*>,, SMSmmML^ v. 197,
** *J^?n°\¥?* *°<&b9» aa Emm&Sk* v. 197, October
ZZ^ I960, p. 324*
a58A mm. m &i&&» p. 723.
259 Ibid.
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of affairs more and more frequently*260
Although the effectiveness of the V.S* embargo
is indisputable, it is also clear that its intended effect

was not accomplished* Instead of raising the peoples*

resentment toward Castro and the revolution, it instead
contributed toward the development of a hi^i degree of
resentment on the part of Cubans toward the United States.

fhis was a continuation of a process which had begun

with the cool U*S* reception to the revolution in 1959,
if not sooner with the pre-revolutionary economic domlnace
of the island by the U*S.

Horray sees more than a

coincidental relationship between Cuba's growing resent
ment toward the United States and its lessening affinity
toward the Soviet Union and its Communist revolutions

„ u*'Shi ^tfU ew that Cuba was all truth,

Washington and Miami all lies about the revoiu^
tion. ©id not that mean the demonstrated liars

^tSi^«b!S! lying ahout another revolution
of I917 ? tf°*

So it is established that the U*S. policy regarding
Cuba caused a resentment of the Cuban people toward the
United States which tended to tain* their opinions of
the principles for which the United States represented.
We have also seen in some detail how America through
its economic policy, in attempts to head off ensuing
socialist revolution, actually pushed Cuba toward that
mid by forcing it to establish close relations with
260

Draper, &S&&& BarolntlMi. p. 132.

^'uonwy, p. 138.
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Communist regimes in Russia and elsewh*». Morray and
others including Castro himself as we viewed ««rlier,
have indicated the growing good feeling between Cuba
and these countries la terns of political relations.
Morray also reminds us of the other side of the

coin - the developing "enemy" image regarding the United
States. "Thanks to the United States, the defense of
the proletarian revolution in birth could take the
inspiring form of patriotism defending anewly won in
dependence from aimperialist aggressor,"
Cuban
exclamations of the "fcapertalist aggressor" as areal
counterrerolutionary threat were taken lightly until
an American trained, financed, and supported mercenary

force attempted to overthrow the Castro regime in the
incident «e refer to as the Bay of Pigs in April 1961.
She counterrevolutionary threat from the U.S. was real
enough, and probably exacerbated the domestic counter
revolutionary paranoia evident on the island.
But what about U.S. impact on the trend toward
socialism through I960? Did this push the Cuban govern

ment toward its socialist policies? »e have seen the
Castro regime pushed In avery tangible way toward the
Comamnist countries for economic reasons by American
trading sanctions, ttodoubtably Cuba would have moved

in this direction at any reate, as one of the goals of
the revolution was certainly economic determinism. As
.mini I I I I
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we have also seen clearly, the Cuban policies were already

beginning in a socialist nature prior to the culmina~
tion of the major problems with the United States in

I960,

And at least through

1960, little evidence exists

which suggests a Soviet magnitude of influence over the

island that would precipitate by itself movement toward
socialsm»

In short, all of these things taken together

contributed to the socialist evo^ement of the Cuban
revolution!

but the evolvement had already been set

in motion by a regime which began to view that the best

application of its policies would encompass a socialist
form,

the external forces merely hurried along a revo

lutionary development that was aimed in at least the
same general direction*

We are now left Oo survey our one remaining
factor of study, that being theoretical and ideological

jusl&fications for the revolution during Castro »s first
two years of rule*

Let's become re^qquainted with the

vary early days after the takeover in January 1959*

Castro, we have seen, gained power while standing
on a platform of numerous individual proposals, many

of which would soon be initiated by the new govemmenti
these proposals had little ideological justification*

We can remember a separation in Castrofs pre-1959 thinking
regarding macroscopic democratic utterances and those

specific policies which drew attention to the movement.

In January of 1959 it was still difficult to gain a
realisation of how Castro's democratic principles

would be translated into specific policy formulations.265
Part of this apparent vacuum in an area where most revo

lutions thrive was the result of the self*pareeptioiiS
of the revolutions leaderst

they did not see themselves

as ideologues, but instead throught of themselves as

•^practical men*"261* As soon as the rebels gained
power, however, it was clear that a ideological attempt

would be madee26^
Casters initial attempt at an ideological doctrine

of sorts was the proclamation of a rather vague humanism,
beginning in early 1959*

It was an attempt at providing

an alternative to capitalism end communism, and it marked

a period for Castro of his portraying the unqualified
uniqueness of the revolution md its leadership, the

26th of July* "CapitaUem may kill men with hunger,"
Castro would say, but "Commuuiam kills men by wiping

out his freedom" ♦^ f&are is little to grasp hold of
here and Fide^e enumeration adds littlei

Heither dictatorships without liberty, nor
liberty without breadt neither dictatorship of

hunger, nor dictatorship of classes) neither
dictatorship of groups, nor ditatorship of castes!
neither dictatorship of class nor oligarchy of
classj government of the people without dicta*
mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmim

^'Revolution ia Cuba,11 Commonweal, v* 69,

January HM 1959* p* 400*

26l|toaper, C^t^pf agfiSX 32& Practice. P* 58*
^Ibld*, p* 60
266Xbid.f p. 39*
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torship or oligarchy! liberty with bread without
terrorf that is humanism*2^
We can clearly see why "humanism" in the Castro

sense prompted Anibal Bscalante, the Communist and high

ranking V.&.2. official, to call the doctrine "ideological

confusion*"^0 Perhaps we ere lucky that Fidel seldom

attempted original political thought* It is important
to note, however, Castro's motivation toward constructing
an ideology. He said later that "Every people has the
right to its own Jobology.

The Cuban revolution is as

Cuban as our music e"269
A much more refined doctrinaire within the revo

lutionary leadership early in 1959 was Che Guevara,
although we must be careful to realise that Che was

also left of Castro in the political sense at this time*

In a speech which Che gave on January 27, Suarez informs

us of no Marxist inclinations, but regard^Lng specific
issues, Che demonstrated a political stance to the left

of the P.S.Pe270
Generally, there were no socialist or Communist

inclinations in the revolutions' rhetoric in the first
months of 1959*

Fidel in a later interview contributes

to this conclusion. After taking power, says Fidel,
he still wasn't a Communist*

"I didn't understand it

^WWs®rmn9 p< 55m
•Per> CmrtffyfoB! J&S&X m& Practfcq. p. 39.

^9Ibid.,
p. 59*
<**# P*
59*
^^Suares, p^. M~3.
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very well," he says*271 He continues*
*+> 4. * *^*t thwug^ «PP*^i*te the relation
that pasted between the phenomenon of Imperialiam

and the situation in Cuba. It is possible that
I Wis then still very much influenced by the
habits and ideasof the petit bourgeois education
I had received.2?2

As early as February, there began to appear afr»

taxations im at least one stance of the Castroists,
«nd that regarded the prospect of elections. We can

recall the profoundly varying policy toward the question
of elections exhibited by the rebels before assuming
power,

nevertheless they had been fairly consistent

regarding the promise of elections after Batista had

been overthrown* The tones had changes, however, and
so had their commitment to elections.

The official

organ of the 26th of July Movement, InOubBU printed
this ia/February«

*
^e ?}d politicians were already preparing
xor elections, and it would be necessary to
circumvent them by turning the July 26 Movement
into a revolutionary party that could control

and ensure the continuation^Qf the work undertaken
by the present government.2?*

Elections were now declared to be two years off,
rather than six months. It was becoming clear to the

revolutionary regime that at least one democratic value,
i.e. elections, could be counterproductive for the

progression of the revolution. In May 1959, the regime
271

"Playboy Interview* Fidel Castro," p. $5.
272Ibld*

275Suarez, p. 46.
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postposned elections indefinitely.

The moderating influence of the Cuban Communists

was apparent from the early portion §§ 1959*

They

issued a document on January 6 which called for, among

other things, an enumeration of the agaarlan reform
initiative of the Sierra Maestra, a quest for new markets

for Cuban products,

the restoration of the 1940 const!-*

tutlon, and support

for democratic elections was pro*

claimed.27*1'

A more moderate document than this eatttigg

from the Cuban Communists is heardly conceivable.

To

top things off, the piece didn't even use any declamatory
rhetoric regarding the United States.

Despite our finding the Cuban Communists in a
stance not as leftist as at least some members of the

26th of July Movement, the fact remains that
were viewed on the island at the

they

time as the most

radical political organization in Cuba, and were generally
suspect.

In fact, revolutionaries like Guevara, who

we have already seen as being left of the Communists,
was often called a Communist when his

line of thought

was actually more radical than that of the P*S.P.

By the middle of 1959* the Castro regime had

already abandoned its theme of humanism, whatever it was!
we will now highlight those trends which predominated

in the Castro ideological thrust through the year 1960

from the end of his "huminist"

^^Suarez, p* 36*

tendency through I960.
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One of the goals of the revolution was clearly that
of economic sovereignty, and it is equally certain

that changes took place in Castro's mind during 1959
which moved the revolution in a socialist direction.

Matthews points out correctly that Fidel became
convinced that he could not make a drastic social revo

lution take place in a democratic situation*27^ Any
opposition to the regime, Castro saw, was inhibiting
or attempting to inMblt the fulfillment of the massive
social changes to which he was dedicated.

A democratic

process would only furnish methods of expression for

these groups, and in this manner, the revolution would
be slowed;

Hot

it would be compromised.

only was radical change a value by itself

for Fidel, but it was also a fundamental prerequisite
for Castro's other primary goal, the attainment of

economic sovereignty*

Huberman and Sweezy point to the

conclusion at which Castro had arrived*

The experience of Cuba proves beyond a doubt
that a social revolution is our indispensible
precondition for the initiation of

economic

growth and social development. The adoption of
a planned economy is enabling Cuba to lay the
groundwork for a balanced, healthy, educated,
and eventually rich society*.*"276
So a movement at least away from democratic

institutions and liberalism, in an ideological sense,
resulted from the perception of the revolution's leaders

27%atthews, p. 210*
^Huberman and Sweezy, p. 21.

129

that western democracy would be counterproductive to
the attainment of their goals of development.
explicit had those goals become?

But how

Castro can be seen

demonstrating the Ideological Vacuum which we have
associated with him as late as November of 1959*

On

the 26th of that month, Suarez describes for us the
scene of Guevara's appointment to the presidency of
the National Bank*

After the appointment, Suarez sar

donically relates his impression of the Castro Ideology*
Castroism has assigned itself a revolutionary
task, one of infinite and boundless dimensions:
the only thing that Castro was able to say was
that "our revolution is profound, it is a

radical revolution," and "a revolution different

~?7

from all other revolutions ever made in the world*nCkff
The criticism here certainly has justification,

both in regard to the pre-1959 period as well as to the
years 1959 a»d I960*

If we look closely, however,

we can identify one theme that is of major consequence

for us*

There is a fairly consistent theme running

through the rhetoric of the revolution right through

1960, and that is

the goal of the material well-being

and happiness of the Cuban
seem subservient to

people*

this one*

All other themes

Man is seen as an end;

that is, "making man happier, making man

better"

is

Castro's words. 7^ Some viewed this theme, and authorized
its discovery for the purpose of showing that Fidel
was not a Communist because of his dedication toward

277Suarez, p* 78*
27®"Playboy Interview* Fidel Castro," p. 80.

130

the wall-being of the Cabas people for the present. Kinsley Martin's
point is a good one.

nothing could >* wore conclusively shov that Fidel is not an

indoctrinated Communist than his remark that he will new deprive
the present generation of piaasure for the theoretical benefit of

future generations.. His idea is the romantic one of making peasants
sad workers happy now in their own Socialist paradise.2?9
Even after proclaiming himself to be a Communist, Castro maintained

tela position, with the emphasis now being on wealth again, but this time
in a more eolleetive sense*

We wm% use political awareness to create wealth* To offer
man mors for doing mere than his duty is to amy his conscience with
money. To give a man more participation in eolleetive wealth be*

esase he dees his duty sad produces mors and creates more for society
is to turn political awareness into wealth.

Is we said before, communism certainly cannot be established

if we do not create abundant wealth. Bat the way to do this, in our
opinion, is mot by creating political awsreness with moaejr or with
wealth, but by creating wealth with politics* awareness?2*0
Above sll else, there is one distinct characteristic of the Cuban

revolution sad its leaders that gives insight to all else that took pises
ia the period wader study. It is the pragmafttic character of the resolu
tion, sad this is demonstrated perfectly ia the weeds of a Cuban rerolutionary as expressed by Hois.

We don't want to leave the impression that we knew sll our

sias sad obstacles ia se clear-cut s way from the very beginning.
Wt didn't* lis came upon one fact at a time, as we begaa tegote
work building our economy sad trying so do something shout the "ntrtployment. We're had to try to meet many problems inddifferent
*??* "£ £*** ***** "*** di*|i* •*•» * ***» ** «•*•• kept
*i*U: **** *** U* ** ** ******* at it, we've some to our oversll sime sad our plans of hew to realise them.2*!

i--4% J?9%SFl*r *5*** ****** e****»f« <**•»" ^^
fie ^^
Msw •———•**
Statesman. •. 61,*

April 21, 1961, p. elh.

Sweesy,^«3!,l * C**te> *^ miMf *** S6*2**8* Hsberasa and
2lli!in»' UMtm.tmkm. p* n.
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Thsn eoatinuing later, he adds that "Insofar as we are Marxist of Left

ist (or eeaauaist, if you will) in our rsTolutionary dsvelopmeat sad thought,

It i. «t *^ f w Prior eo-dt-nt to-H^lHT."282
Us have viewed ia this chapter the Castro resume's socialist de

velopment ia terms of the policy initiatives sad programs ef the revolu
tionary regime during its first tee years ef rule* we noted s treat

toward a socialist orssatatioa that culminated ia the prssence of s so*

oialist economy ia Cuba by the end of i960. Then we examined the Impact
of the 9*3* preaence on the revelation after January 1, ie$et and found
a correlation between the American policy toward the island and its de

veloping socialist tendencies. We discovered that the U.S.-Soviet impact
mored the revolution mere quickly ia a direction ia which it was already
headed.

Sad finally, we have surveyed the theoretical undertones of the

regime daring these first two rears.

A lack ef ideological Justifica

tion arose primarily out ef Hie pragmatic characteristic of the revolu

tion»s leaders* Those goals which did find expression concerned policies

that weald bring shout happiness sad the good life for Hie people ss
seea as possible.
IV

Us esa recall that we promised ia the introduction to this paper
to explicate what the goals ef the revolution were ia order that we could

make a Judgement concerning His charges toward the revolution of betrayal*
the goals ef this revolution, we have fewad, are somewhat difficult to
grasp, eat nevertheless, ia looking for them it is true Hist we discover

important facets ef the f*astroist movement which hate previously been
hinted at bat net coherently stated.

Ws remember Hist there are many who argue Hist the revolution

was betrayed, a consequence of Hat lefward push which culminate eventually
282821
Ibid., p. 110*
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ia communism.

So one fighting the revolution, it is argued, were fighting

for communism*

Few really knew who they were fighting for, or what* they

only knew vast it was they were fighting against* The primary fast about

the 26th ef July Movement before 1959 was its complete lack ef say uni
fying sad cohesive doctrine, one formulatsd meticulously befere any ac
tive revolutionary insurgency would begin*

What goals this revolution

did have could only be demonstrated sporadically through it policy iaits*

tlves prmar to taking power* lie have Sfiasrtaed those initiatives, aad at

ia s position new to declare our perception of the goals of the Cuban rev
olution*

Ms have eUseovered that the overriding factor ia thinking of the
Cuban rsvolutionariss epitomised by Fidel ia its pragmatic characterj

this finds Its expression aest importantly la Hie lack ef development of

a unifying ideology. What goals that vera apparent to us included first

ef all, material betterment ef the people.

The revolution declared

through its policies a goal ef promoting a kind of liberation for these
classes which had for at leait the las century been oppressed at Hie
hands ef sa adverse eeisuamte struetare*

This goal ef material betterment

for "the people" was net moralistic ia the sense ef proclaiming values
eottcsrning what was right or wrong shout private ownership, eolleetive
ownership, sad the like.

The aevsaaat simply aupperted a radical change

ia the property ownership structure ea the island because the present
system was unfair, sad that a ehsags initiated by the government through

A aseead goal was a nation-building one, of o^vslopaeat.

Al

though short term ctonsideratiotts ware emphasised, it was indicated Hist
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the purpose of accomplishing this goal, the close ties with the United

States would have to be slackened significantly*

This latter point was really a third goal by itself, although it
is integrally related to the second goal. For Robert Taber, "The Cuban

Revolution was and is, above all, a Cuban declaration of independence

from the United States.*2^ as we have seen, many of Hie problems within
Hie Cuban economic, politicla, sad social systems were directly attribu
table to the economic role ef the U.S. in Cuba*

It was clear that so

meaningful development or iaprovenent in the way ef life on the island

could be brought about until this adverse influence was virtually elim
inated from the island, that is la an objective sense. With a more sub

jective consideration, it farther became increasingly clear to the revolu
tionaries that revolutionary change cetld net take place unless the
American influence was brought to a close.

And finally, we return again to Hie pragmatic nature of Fidel

Osatro and his movement. Whatever approach that the revolution would
take ia fera of government and ideology, it would have to be consistent

with these down to earth goals of the revolution. The ultimate rejection
ef liberalism and democracy in the western sense by Castro and his follow

ers can be seen ia this litftt. There was a beliif in macroscopic liberal—

democratic political ideals which shoved itself on numerous oecasion prior

to 19fl>. It became apparent to the Castrolsts that a real resolution,
something which was necessary to accomplish Hie goal described, would not

bs possible within a liberal framework. On the basis of the previous
Cuban experience alone, Castro eaae to believe less and less in the wes
tern conaeption of democracy and capitalism.

Ctaee in power Castro tamed against the system that sseaed
respnaible for the misery of Hie Cuban people* That the system he
is establishing in its place is more similar to that of Red China's

28^aber, "Castro's Cuba," The Nation, p# 6!u

13c

er Soviet Russia's ia testimony to the success Hie Communist nations
have had in presenting thoawclies as examples ef rapid industrialisation and to the failure of capitalism to give the aajorivy of
Cubans anything acre than a dirt fsoornuan outdoor privy, sad a peer
diet* That the great strides ia economic development ia the Com

munist world have been brought at a great cost in political lib*
arty seems to be ef minor osacara to the triumvirate ef the ittwv*»
eTw vulflurry government* ^***.

Expediency in carrying out the real goals of Hie revolution were
the cause ef the apparent contradictions whcih we have viewed in relatioaa
to Castro's political thought*

These included the retraction of the

promise of elections, given such importance la some of the writings re*
searched*

The ideological move towar^coamnnisn «**yi be seen to an extant as

the filling of wist up to that time had bead an ideological vacuum in the
revolution.

This profess oceured after the pattern of policies had been

vet, as demonstrated by the fact that Hie country was socialist by the

ead ef I960, as ve have seen, while the situation wasa't called a socialist
one until the following year*

This, ve might add, is in reverse ef what

ia usually the case ia revolutions.

Finally, a concluding ward about the socialist evelvaaeat ef the

Cuban revolution through the year I960***
Given the goals of the revolution and the social-democratic or
ientation ef Castro and his iisifsssiut attributed to his Qrtodoxo back

ground, the Jump is socialism was net a long one. Castro's skepticism
ef the Cuban political system was obvious em^r$ but as was his apparen*
dadioation to liberal-demooraUc ideals* During the course of the stag*
gle for power, we began to view his objection to elections on certain

281*Ramon Hulsey, "The Cuban Revolution! Its Impact ea American
*ereiga ruttcy," j§SS& Si latoraatloaal Affaire, w* n?,iue* 2, i960,
p* ifJJ.
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grounds because of their being inexpedient at the time, while proclaiming
the value of elections as a ruli.

This could be taken as an example of

the situations which were to comet constant conflict between the real

goals if therevolution and a liberal-democratic frame of reference*

It

is interesting to note also that it is this dichotomy which separates
those who believe that Hie revolution was betrayed and those who don't*
The roots for the torn to socialism showed inconspicuously be*
fore Fidel's ascension to power, but they were nevertheless present*

After January 1959* we began seeing traces of Castro's sacrificing prenciples of liberalism for the pursuance of his revolutionary goals, both
in policfr sad in rhetoric^ ve also saw the ever-present U.S. influence

pushing the regime into ajaore rapid evelveaeat away from those liberal
values* By the end of I960, the evolveaent toward socialism was com*
plate*

Much argument ia indeed possible regarding the goals ef Hie revol
ution, sad the sacrifice of liberal values that ensued over the course of

time studied* But for now it is appropriate to sight this obsevation
qot>d 'r "tor

aads in i960 - "Bat, for ghodggeodor evil, Cubans, for Hie first tims

since the landing of Columbus, have their destinies in their own hands." ^
At least one ef their prescribed goals had been accomplished.
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